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The article of which the following pages are a translation ap
peared in the number of the Revue des Deux Mondes for October
15th, 1862. It is there entitled “ Campagne de l’Armee du Poto
mac, Mars-Juillet, 1862,” and bears the signature of “A. Trognon.” It is well understood in Paris that this signature is the
om de plume of one of the princes of the House of Orleans, and
from the internal evidence afforded by the paper itself I have
been led to believe that it was probably written by the Prince de
Joinville, who accompanied his nephews, the Comte de Paris and
the Duc de Chartres, throughout the period of their service in
the Army of the Union, and that it was composed upon the data
furnished by the journals of one or both of those princes, collated
with his own observations and recollections. I have accordingly
accepted the well-authenticated rumor which ascribes its author
ship to him. I have also taken the liberty of affixing to the
translation a title which more fully describes the scope and
nature of the paper. As the reader will perceive, it is a critical
and historical sketch of the rise, progress, character and fortunes
of the army which was assembled at Washington for the invasion
of Virginia, from the time of its first organization in 1861, down
to the end of the campaign before Richmond in 1862.
It is written with the freedom and force of an accomplished
military man, anxious to do justice to the merits and to point out
the defects of an army which he has studied in the camp and in
the field; master of his subject; temperate in tone, and in stylo
equally free from the carelessness of the amateur, and the ped
antry of the professional soldier.
Recent events have given a peculiar importance to the facts
here presented, and it will not be easy for any candid person to
read these pages without feeling that the causes of the military
misfortunes which will make the year 1862 so painfully remark
able in our history demand the fullest and most searching inves
tigation.
(3)
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PREFACE.

The failure of the Army of the Potomac to achieve either of
the grand immediate objects wliieh it moved from before 'Wash
ington in March to effect, the dispersion, namilv. of the main
confederate army under General Johnston and the occupation
of llichmond. has been variously attributed:
1. To the constitutional unfitness of General McClellan for the
conduct of operations requiring boldness! in the conception and
decision in the execution.
2. To the presumed bias of that commander’s political opinions.
Those who adopt this theory of the origin of our reverses, charge
upon General McClellan that, he has always sought to avoid
driving the insurgent States to the wall, in the belief that the
soothing inlluence of time and the blockade would eventually
bring them to accept terms of reconciliation and reunion.
3. To the constant interference of mt “Anlic Council” at
’Washington with the plans of our commanders in the field,
an interference which when it does not positively interrupt the
progress of operations actually begun, If depriving a general of
some portion of the force on which his Calculations were based,
must still greatly cripple his ellicieney by making it incompatible
with common prudence for him to take serious risks and essay
adventurous combinations.
4. To the superior military abilities of the Southern command
ers enabling them to outmanoeuvre our leaders and to accumulate
overwhelming forces upon the separate armies of an array in the
aggregate greatly outnumbering their own.
'
The testimony under these different heads of the Prince de
Joinville may be thus summed up:
1. The Prince de Joinville testifies that General nlcClellan’s
original plan of campaign was in the highest degree direct and
aggressive.
This ]>Ian wns formed at a time when the command of the
waters of “rginia was entirely in our hands, and it involved so
rapid a concentration of the federal forces at a point within
striking distance of Pichmond as must hat e been followed either
by the evacuation of that city or by :t decisive action in the field.
II b-'tifu-s also that when by the sudden and formidable advent
of the .Merrimac and by the retreat of Johnston from -Manassas
upon Itichmond and Yorktown, this original plan w:ls made
impracticable, Gem al McClellan conceived a second plan for
turning the position at Yorktown, which was also direct and
aggre-site in its character, and which was made impracticable
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by the sudden withdrawal of the corps farmee necessary to its
execution.
In respect to the operations of McClellan before Richmond, he
testifies that it was the intention of that general to follow up his
arrival upon the Chickahominy by an immediate assault in com
bination with the army of McDowell, and that this intention was
defeated by the complete separation of that army from his own
in consequence of orders sent to McDowell from Washington.
He gives it as his opinion, however, that greater activity and
more rapid aggressive movements on the part of General McClel
lan daring the months of ''lay and June and at the battle of Fair
Oaks, might possibly have resulted in the fall of Richmond, but
this opinion he qualifies by intimating that the disposition of the
General to instant action was curbed and dampened during that
time by the influence of the checks previously imposed upon the
development of his strategy; and he ascribes the final extrica
tion of the Army of the Potomac from a position which had be
come untenable, to a movement in an extraordinary degree deci
sive and audacious.
2. Writing after a familiar intercourse of months with the Gen
eral-in-Chief of the army, in which he must necessarily have im
bibed his leading views in respect to national policy, the Prince’s
language makes it more than probable that General McClellan
earnestly believed a prompt and decisive victory over the confed
erate army to be the surest if not the only means of securing the
restoration of the Union, and that so believing, he thought it
essential that a conciliatory temper towards the Southern people
should precede, accompany and succeed the victory of the sword.
3. The Prince de Joinville asserts distinctly that the interfer
ence of the Government with the plans of General McClellan was
constant, embarrassing, and of such a nature as finally to make it
next to impossible for that General to risk the safety of the army
under his charge in any extensive operation the success of which
was not substantially assured in advance.
4. The Prince’s account of the retreat of McClellan from Rich
mond shows that he considers the confederate Generals to haxe
been completely ont-manamvred and out-witted at that time by
their adversary, whose concentration they did not comprehend in
time to prevent it, and whose escape they were not able to inter
cept although superior to him in numbers and in knowledge of the
country, fighting within sight of their base, and supported by the
active good will of a whole population.
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PREFACE.

rims the evidence upon these four points of a witness whose
competence and impartiality we have certainly no rijxht or reason
to impend). lie may have been misinformed; uninformed, the
rusponsibilit v which he assumes in publishing his narrative forbids
us to suppose he can have been.
Putil tiie publication of authentic oflieial documents, the paper
here submitted to the reader must be considered to be the fullest
and fairest story of the great Campaign of 1862 yet given to the
world. As such it should receive the most serious attention.
The reputation of any one man or set of men is a slight thing in
comparison with the success or failure of the nation in a war of
life and death. If the Prince de Joinville's statements can be
proved incorrect and his inferences nnsmiml ; if General McClel
lan be rcaliv responsible by reason of his military incapacity or his
political theories for our great disappointments, then it will be
much for the nation to forgive him the past and forget him in the
future.
If the Prince's statements be proved correct and his inferences
sound, they must be regarded as a substantial indictment of the
Administration in respect to its management of the war ; and the
removal of General McClellan from the command of his army in
the field must be pronounced a sign of evil omen on which too
much stress can hardly be laid.
I believe the present translation, although rapidly made, will
not be found inaccurate. 1 have ventured to append to it a few
notes upon subjects connected with the condition of things at the
South, in respect to which I had reason to believe myself more
fully and corrcctlv informed than the circumstances of the author
permitted him to be.
W. II. II.
Xkw York, \ov, 15, 18G2.

Note. Since the fast edition of tliik translation was issued, I have received autliorm from Brigadicr-Geni ral Barry, Cliicf of Artillery of the Armv of the Potomac,
to cor reel I he writer s Elul, w no n i in regard to I hl loss of guns on the retreat from Rich
mond ' p. .i.,
lusivad of three, the army lost but one siege-gun, tin S-inch howitzer,
Ilie carriage of which broke down. No feature of this exlriHdinary retreat reflects
high, r credit upon the army than this brilliant achievement of the artillery service
and its chief; and ns the most extravagant falsehoods upon this point have obtained
credence and cir< illation abroad, 1 take a pin lictilar pleasure in here recording the
lent II, conlident that no man out of ii. erica will more heartily rejoice in it than the
■ 'hot whom 1 am thus enabled Io sc right.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Military events succeed each other rapidly in America,
and the public follows them with an attention which is all the
more anxious that it does not always understand them, partly
through lack of knowledge of the organization of American
armies and of the character of their commanders and their
soldiers; but above all, through the difficulty of getting at
the impressions of persons who, being competent to observe
these memorable struggles, actually took part in them them
selves.
The pages here offered to the reader, will perhaps meet this
legitimate public curiosity. They are the sum and setting
forth of the notes of an officer, who took part in the last bat
tles in Virginia, and who has never ceased to watch and fol
low up the grand operations of the war, in respect to which,
he will, no doubt, give us new details; our duty is simply
to gather up and group the impressions and the recollections
scattered through the numerous letters, and the private jour
nal of the officer in question.

I.
Cbc Creation of fbt ^rnui.
On my arrival in America, the curtain had just fallen on
the first act of the secessionist insurrection. The attack on
Fort Sumter by the people of Charleston, had been the pro
logue, then came the disaster of Bull Run. The army of the
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South was encamped Avitliin sight of Washington. Works
of defence were hastily thrown up around that Capital. The
roar of the cannon was heard from time to time along the
front of the line. Amid these commotions the army of the
1’otomac came into being.
Up to this time, the Federal Government, taken by surprise,
had only hit in haste upon certain provisional measures which
aggravated instead of dissipating the danger. All the advan
tages, at the outset of the insurrection, were with the insur
gents. They were ready for an armed conflict, the Forth whs
not. In truth the work of secession had been long preparing.
I'nder the pretext of a military organization to repress
slave insurrections, the States of the South had created
a permanent militia, ready to march at the first signal.
Special schools had been founded in which the sons ot
the Slaveholders imbibed the inspiration of those good
and bad qualities which combine to form a race of sol
diers. .Meanwhile, the northern man, reposing with confidence
upon the regular operation of the Constitution, remained ab
sorbed in his own affairs behind his counter. The national
army of the Union belonged almost entirely to the men of the
South. For many years the Federal power had been in their
hands, and they had not failed to fill, with creatures of their
own, al] the departments of its administration, and especially
the war oflice and the army. 'Mr. Jefferson Davis, long
Secretary at War, had done more to accomplish this than any
other single man.
The disposition of the northern people facilitated his task.
Among the laborious and till somewhat puritanical populations
of New Fnglaml, the career of arms was looked upon as that
of an idler. The Wot Point Academy enjoyvd no great con
sideration in that part of the i^jimtry, and the heads of fami
lies wen; by no means anxious to send their sons to it. Finally,
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on the eve of the crisis which was to follow Mr. Lincoln’s
election, Mr. Floyd, now a General among the secessionists
and then war Secretary under Mr. Buchanan, had taken pains
to send to the South the contents of all the Federal arsenals,
and to despatch the whole of the regular army to Texas, put
ting between the army and Washington the barrier of the
slave States, in order to paralyze the sentiment of duty which
might lead the soldiers to follow that small number among
their officers who should remain loyal to their flag. Nothing
accordingly was lacking in the precautions taken by the Con
federacy. They had dealt with the navy as with the army.
It was dispersed at the four corners of the globe.
As to the North, it did just nothing. Yet it had not 'want
ed warnings. For many years Secession had been openly
preached. A curious book called the “ Partisan Leader,” pub
lished twenty years ago, is a proof of this. Under the form
of a novel this book is a really prophetic picture of the war
which is at this moment desolating Virginia, a picture so
highly colored as easily to explain tire ardor with which the
imagination of the Creole ladies has espoused the cause of the
South. But it was believed in the North, as in various other
places, that “all would come right.” The North felt itself the
stronger, and saw no reason for troubling itself prematurely.
It was the old story of the hare and the tortoise. Moreover,
in the last resort, the North counted on the several hundred
thousand volunteers set down in the almanacks as represent
ing the military force of the country, and supposed by the
popular mind to be irresistible.
The North was quickly un
deceived. The people of the South were beaten in the presi
dential election. They ■were still masters of the Senate, and
it was not the loss of power which roused them, it was the
wound inflicted on their pride. This was used by the ambi
tions managers of the party of Secession to excite the South-

10

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

crn mind, and the standard of the insurrection was raised
Tlie federal power, still passive, allowed the period for com
promise, the period for conciliation, and the period for ener
getic and instantaneous repression to roll by alike unimproved,
<>n both sides the States begin to arm for the inevitable strife;
but the South has the warriors, the arms, the organization, the
will and the passion. TheXorth is impotenteven to provision
Port Sumter, and the volunteers raised for three months, as if
that was to be the limit of the campaign, get themselves beaten
at Bull linn, not through want of courage, for the instances
of individual valor were numerous; nor yet through the fault
of General McDowell, who commanded them, and whose
। dans deserved success, but through the absence of organization
and of discipline.
After Bull Hun there was no room left for illusions. A
great war was before the country. Intoxicated with pride,
encouraged by all those who for one or another reason wished
ill to the United States, the South it was plain would never
again consent to return to the Union until it should have suf
fered severe reverses.
The hopes of its ambitious leaders were more than realized.
They had struck a successful vein, and nothing could make
them abandon it. At the Xorth, on the other hand, humiliation
liml opened all men’s eyes. It was felt that, having on their
side, with the superiority of population and wealth, the right
and the legality of the question—having the sacred trust of
the Constitution to defend against a factions minority, which
after all, only took up arms to extend slavery—they would
become a b . -word for the world if thev did not resist, They
Mt. besides, that if the doctrine of secession were once admit
ted and sanctioned, it would be susceptible of infinite appli
cation; that, from one rupture to another, it would bring
about a chaos which must very soon open the way to dcspo-
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tism. They felt, in short, that it was chimerical to suppose
that two Powers could live side by side in peace who had
not yet made real trial of their respective strength — who
were separated radically, notwithstanding their common
tongue and origin, by the institution of slavery—the one wish
ing its development and the other its abolition—who were
separated, also, by interests which no Custom House line
could conciliate, and by the impossibility of regulating, with
out daily quarrels, the numerous questions connected with the
navigation of the Western rivers. All these reasons, obvious
to every mind, added to the pain of wounded self-love, and
to the novelty of a warlike movement in that land of peace,
resulted in setting- on foot the immense armament with which
the Northern States have up to this day sustained the war
against the powerful efforts of Secession.
Let us pause here before passing on to the numerous criti
cisms that we shall have to make, to admire the energy, the
devotion, the spirit of courageous self-denial with which the
population of those States—rather leading the Government
than led by it—has of itself, and under the single impulse of
its patriot?? good sense, given uncounted men and money, sac
rificed its comforts, renounced voluntarily and for the public
good, its tastes, its habits, even to the freedom of the press,
and that, too, not under the influence of a momentary passion,
not in a transport of transient enthusiasm, but coolly and for
a distant object—that of national greatness.
The North went seriously to work to create an army—a
grand army. Seconded by public opinion, Congress resolved
upon the raising of five hundred thousand men, with the
funds necessary for the purpose. Unfortunately it could not
command the traditions, the training and the experience
requisite to form and manage such a military force. It was
able to collect masses of men and immense material, as if by
enchantment; but it had not the power to create by a vote
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(lie spirit of discipline, of obedience, and that hierarchical
re-peet. without Avltich there may be armed crowds, but there
can be no army. Here is the reef upon which many gencroii> efforts have been dashed to pieces. Here is an original
vice whose fatal inllucnee we shall everywhere encounter.
We shall discover the germ of this vice by a rapid examina
tion of the machinery which was used to improvise this first
creation.
According to American law the Federal Government
maintains, in time of peace, a permanent regular army. It
may, besides, in cases of necessity, war or insurrection, call
io its standard as many regiments of volunteers as it may deem
expedient. The regular army, formed by recruiting only,
numbered 2O.000 men before the secession. The officers,
educated exclusively at the military school, were remarkable.
Well educated, versed practically in their profession, under
standing the necessity of absolute command, they maintained
in their small force lite most vigorous discipline. This was
:m excellent nucleus for an army, but the rebellion, as I
have before remarked, hail brought on its dissolution. The
greater part of the officers—more than three hundred—passed
over to the South. The soldiers—till Irish or German—lost
in the solitudes of Texas, were dispersed. From two to three
thousand men, at most, returned from California or Utah to
take partin the war. This was chiefly important as bringing
back a certain number of officers who might preside over the
organization—such as it was-—of the army of volunteers about
to be raised. In Europe, where we have learned to recog
nize the comparative value of the regular soldier, and of this
ci tly and capricious amateur soldier, who is called a volun
teer. the lo.-s of the aid of the regular army, small as it was,
would have brought us to despair, and we should have set to
umk to increase the army by enlarging its organization and
ucorpomting recruits. An army of sixty thousand regulars
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would have done more than double or triple the number of
volunteers; but in America they do not know this, and be
sides, they do not wisli to know it. It would involve a re
nunciation jf the general and deeply rooted creed, that every
American, when he wishes to do a thing, may find within
himself, without any apprenticeship, the power to do it; and,
consequently, there is no volunteer who, when he puts on the
uniform, does not at the same time put on the qualities of a
soldier. Add to this that the West Point officers, simply from
the fact that they have received a superior education, and re
cognize the necessity of a hierarchy, are regarded as aristo
crats, and everything aristocratic is bad. Such officers were
safe with the mercenaries who consented to obey them, and
under their orders to keep the peace against the frontier
tribes of Indians; but to place under their command a great
army, which must be reduced to the subordination of the
camps, was to run the risk of grave political dangers. An
eighteenth Brumaire is not to be made with volunteers.
Therefore, everything having to be created, it was decided to
create an army of volunteers—an ephemeral army, compara
tively inefficient, and, above all, ruinously expensive. The
American volunteer is richly paid. Ilis pay is $13—more
than 65 francs—per month. Besides that, an allowance of $3
per month is paid to his wife in his absence; and this, it may
be said in passing, has brought about many sudden marriages
at the moment of departure for the army. Ordinarily there
are no deductions from his pay for clothing or other supplies.
The volunteer is provided with everything, and is supplied so
liberally with rations that he daily throws away a part of
them. One may imagine what such an army must cost.
This would not matter if even at such an expense the country
were well served. It is not so, however. It is ill served for
want of discipline, not that the military laws and regulations
were not severe enough ; but they were not enforced, and
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could not be, in consequence of the primary organization of
the regiment, and of the composition of its corps of officers.
And here we come to the essential vice of an American army.
How is a regiment of volunteers actually formed ? As soon
as Congress has voted the number of men, they calculate at
A ishington the quota which each State must furnish, accord
ing to its resources and population. This calculation being
made, each Governor announces that there are to be so many
regiments raised within the limits of his jurisdiction. The
regiment of one battalion only, is the American military unit
Affairs arc managed in this way :
Persons present themselves offering to raise a regiment.
Each sets forth his claims, his intinence in the State, or amone
a certain portion of the population, which will enable him to
procure easily the necessary number of men, his devotion to
the party in power, etc. From among the persons thus pre
sented the Governor makes his choice. Generally the person
upon whom the choice falls lias laid it down as a condition
precedent that he shall have the command of the regiment;
and thus Mr. So-and-So, a lawyer or a doctor, never having
handled a sword, but feeling within himself an improvised
vocation, becomes a colonel at the start, and puts himself in
connection with all the recruiting agencies and with all the
furnishers of equipment and clothing supplies for the future
reghnent. The next thing is to find the soldiers; this is not
so easy, for there is a great deal of rivalry. They apply to all
Hnir comrades, traverse the country, mid resort to various
plan.-. 'fliis is done quickly and well in America, for the
Americans have an inventive mind. Most frequently they
iind friends who, seized with (he same martial ardor, promise
to bring so many recruits if they be made—the one captain,
tin- other lieutenant, another sergeant, and so forth. The
IraincAork is formed and is partly filled up ; it only remains
to complete it. ft h then that recourse is had to extraor
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dinary measures—to those gigantic posters whit (i set forth in
pompons terms all the advantages to be gained by joining
the corps. They go among the Catholic priests to procure
Irishmen, and give the coveted privilege of sutlership to the
individual who promises the necessary complement of men.
Thus the regiment finds itself organized, and the lists are
carried to the Governor, who approves everything. The regi
ment is mustered, clothed and equipped, and forwarded by
railroad to the scat of war. Sometimes, even frequently, the
grades are made to depend on election : but that is generally
only a formality, as everything has been arranged beforehand
by those interested.
The inconveniences of this system are obvious. The officers,
from the colonel down to the lowest in rank, do not know the
first word of the military art, and if they have any real aptitude
for it and any warlike qualities, these are still to be proved.
The soldiers have no illusions on this point. “They know
no more about it than we do, we are well acquainted with
them,” they say of those who command them. Hence, there
is no superiority of knowledge on the part of the officer over
the soldier, and no superiority of social position in a country
where no such superiority is recognized. Most frequently,
also, it is with an idea of being a candidate for political office
that the officer has taken up arms. It is to make himself a
name in the eyes of the voters. And these future voters are
the soldiers. What would become of the popularity he ex
pects to enjoy if he were rough to the roldiers, or showed
himself too exacting in the service? All these causes bring
about the want of authority with officers, and the want of res
pect among soldiers. Of course, then, there can be neither
hierarchy nor discipline. All this has been ameliorated bv
force of necessity, and in the school of experience. Even from
the beginning there were exceptions to it; some colonels, im
pelled by a real vocation, or animated by an ardent patriotism,

1G
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succeeded in overcoming the obstacles placed in their path.
Sometimes an oilicer of the regular army, desirous of distinguidung himself, ami having intluencc enough in his State,
raised a regiment and obtained from it an admirable result.
Thus, a young lieutenant of engineers, named Warren, was
marvellously successful with the Fifth New York regiment,
of which he was colonel. This regiment served as engineers
and artillery at the siege of Yorktown, and, having again be
come infantry, conducted itself like the most veteran troops
at the battles of the ('liickahominy, where it lost half of its
forfe. And yet these were volunteers—but, they felt the know
ledge and superiority of their chief. Generally, however, the
chief is simply a comrade who wears a different costume. lie
is obeyed in every day routine, but voluntarily. In the same
way the soldiers don’t trouble themselves about him when cir
cumstances become serious. From the point of view of
American equality, there is no good reason to obey him. Be
sides, in the eyes of the greater number this title of volunteer
docs not signify the soldier who devotes himself generously
and voluntarily to save the country or to acquire glory, but
rather the well-paid soldier, who only does what lie wishes
and pleases, This is so true that, ^though the fly and time
of service are the same for volunteers and regulars, the reernitjng of regulars has become almost impossible. All that
class of men who enlisted when regulars alone existed, from
a taste for camp life, now join the volunteers. On one side
is license. on 1hc other discipline—the choice is easily made.
The habits created by universal suffrage also play their part
an i are reproduced on the field of battle* By a tacit agree
ment the regiment marches against the enemy, advances under
lire and begins to deliver its volleys; the men are brave, very
brave; they are killed and wounded in great numbers, and
then, wnmi by a tacit agreement they think they have done
enough for military honor, they all march off together. The
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colonel perhaps attempts to give a direction, an impulse,
but generally his efforts are in vain. As to the officers, they
never think of it. Why should they attempt it, and why
should they be obeyed if the majority of the regiment has
made up its mind to retreat? Obedience in such an army is
like the obedience which children playing atsoldiersrender to
him among their comrades whom they have made their cap
tain. Is any argument necessary to show the inconvenience
of such a state of things? Nevertheless, the Government put
its hand on an immense mass of armed men, a multitude
of regiments; for the country had responded unanimously
and vigorously to the call for volunteers. Never, wre believe,
has any nation created, of herself, by her own will, by
her single resources, without coercion of any kind, without
government pressure, and in such a short space of time, so
considerable an armament. Free governments, whatever may
be their faults and the excesses to which they may give rise,
always preserve an elasticity and creative power which noth
ing can equal. Only, the vices of organization which we have
pointed out singularly impaired the value of this military
gathering.
It was to remedy these vices as far as possible that General
McClellan and old officers of West Point, who had become,
by fdree of circumstances, generals of brigade or of division,
devoted all their efforts. Regiments were brigaded by fours,
and brigades divisioned by threes. To each division four
batteries were given, three of them served by volunteers and
one by regulars. The latter was to serve as a model for the
others, and its captain took command of all the artillery of
the division. At one time they had some idea of placing a
battalion of regulars in each division of volunteers, to act
the part of “ lance head,” which Lord Clyde attributes to
the European troops in the Sepoy armies; but the idea was
abandoned. It appeared wiser to keep together the only
2
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icallv disciplined troops that they possessed; besides, as it was
made, the divisional formation was a good one, and Las been
of verv great utility. It next became necessary to provide
for the administrative services for provisions, munitions and
transports, and to organize artillery reserves, the engineer
corps, the pontoon corps, the topographical brigade, the tele
graphs and the hospitals.
This prodigious labor was accomplished with a rapidity and
a success which are extraordinary, when we think that the
whole thing had to be achieved without any assistance from
the past. 2\ot onh nas there nobody to be found who knew
anything, except from hooks, of the management of the
numerous threads by which an army is held together and
moved : not only was the country destitute of all precedents
in the matter ; the number even of those who had travelled
in Europe and seen for themselves what a grand collection of
troops is, was infinitely small. The American army had no
traditions but those of the Mexican campaign of General
Scott—a brilliant c^npaign, in which there were many diffi
Unities to be overcome, but which presented nothing like the
gigantic proportions of the present war. Moreover, in Mexico
General Scott had with him the entire regular army, and here
there only remained its feeble ruins. In Mexico the regulars
were the main body, the volunteers were only the accessory,
and, as it were, the ornament. The old general, who was one
day asked what he then did to maintain discipline in their
ranks. answered, "Oh, they knew that if they straggled off
they would be massacred by the guerrillas.’’ The two cases,
therefore, had nothing in common, and the management of
tlie-e great armies of volunteers, in spite of all the efforts to
regularize them, was a problem which offered many unknown
data.
'
At the Smith the organization of the insurrectionary forces
presented fewer difficulties. nic revolutionary government
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had quickly assumed in the hands of Mr. Jefferson Davis the
dictatorial form. Sustained by an Oligarchy of three hundred
thousand slaveholders, of whom he was the choice, and whose
violent passions he personified, Mr. Davis had set himself
actively at work to cieate an army fit to contend against the
formidable preparations of the federal government. A former
pupil of West Point, a former General of volunteers in Mexico,
a former Secretary of War in the Union, he had all the re
quisite conditions to perform his task well. Ue applied to it
his rare capacity. He was seconded by the flower of the for
mer federal staff, by the more military spirit of the Southern
ers, and also by the assistance of all the adventurers, filibusters
and others, whom the South had always nurtured in view of
those continual invasions to which slavery condemns her. I
have no idea of drawing here a sketch of the separatist army;
but I wish to point out two important differences which mark
its organization as compared with that of the North. The
officers were chosen and nominated directly by the President,
and were sent with the regiments to fill their positions. There
was no comradeship between them and the soldiers. The sol
diers did not know them, and therefore regarded them as their
superiors. They were not men who were subsequently, in
private life, to find themselves again their equals. In short
these officers belonged to that class of slave owners who living
by the labor of their inferiors and accustomed to command
them, attached to the soil by the hereditary transmission of
the paternal estate and of the black serfs who people it, pos
sess to a certain extent, the qu alities of aristocrats. In theii
hands the discipline of the army could not suffer. Numerous
shootings caused discipline to be respected, and on the day
of battle they led their soldiers valiantly, and were valiantly
followed. In the second place, Mr. Davis quickly perceived
that the volunteer system would be powerless to furnish him
wi ch enough men to sustain th b fratricidal strife into which
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he had plunged his country. lie came rapidly to conscription,
to forced recruiting. It was no longer a contract betwee. J the
soldier and his colonel, or between the soldier and the State,
which would still leave a possibility of its being annulled, and
which brought with it absolute obligations. It was the law,
the authority, the power of the State, which carried off all
able-bodied men and made them march up blindly to what was
called the defence of their country. There was no hesitation
possible. Hound by the obligation of duty, the soldier became
at once more submissive and more reconciled to the sacrifice.
In the situation in which the South was, these measures were
wise, and there is no doubt that they contributed at the begin
ning of the war to secure great advantages to its army. Never
theless, we are far from reproaching Air. Lincoln for not hav
ing recourse lb such, violent measures. The leaders of an insur
rection recognize no obsftcle, and are stopped by no scruples
when the object is to assure the triumph of their ambitious
views, and particularly to escape the consequences of defeat.
They recoil before nothing, and have no repugnance to revo
lutionary expedients; but Mr. Lincoln and his advisers were
the legitimate representatives of the nation, and if it fell to
them to suppress a revolt, they did not wish, unless in ease of
'absolute necessity, to touch the guarantees which, up to that
time, had made the American people the happiest and freest
people of the earth.

II
plans of ibe ©nnrpnign.
The army once iinjjroviscd, it next became necessary tc
decide 1 >w to employ it—in other words, to choose the plan
of the campaign. The general plan was simple. The idea of
conquering and occupying a territory so vast as that of the
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Confederate States could not even be considered ; but for the
purpose of escaping the dangers, actual and possible, of such a
formidable insurrection, it was necessary to attain three re
sults: to blockade efficiently the insnrgflit coast; to get con
trol of the Mississippi liver, and of the entire system of West
ern waters ; and, finally, to drive the rebel government out
Richmond, its capital. By the blockade the rebels are isolated
from the foreigners whose sympathy had been promised them ;
the introduction of powder and firearms is prevented ; expor
tation, and the resources which it might have procured, are
stopped ; and, finally, the introduction of supplies from abroad
is guarded against, which would, in spite of the state of war,
have penetrated into the North, to the great detriment of
national manufactures and of the Federal treasury. To the
navy belonged the duty of this blockade. It discharged that
duty rather inefficiently at first for want of sufficient means ;
but by degrees the surveillance grew closer and closer until it
became difficult to evade it.
The possession of the Mississippi was an imperious necessitv. The great river and its affluents are the outlets of all the
countries which they water. They are the arteries of the
Western States—States which have, up to this time, remained
faithful to the Union, but in which their material interests
might at length chill their enthusiasm, and speak even louder
than their convictions. To restore the Union as a matter of
interest, on the basis of slavery, has been for a long time past
the programme of the Southern leaders. To abandon to them
without a struggle the Western rivers would be to concede
half the question. It was therefore decided to bring on a con
flict on this theatre. The navy recaptured New Orleans by a
brilliant coup de main. That was the principal point. The
Federals thus put the key in their pocket. As to the course
of the Mississippi, the task of reconquering it was confided to
the Western armies, admirably seconded by Commodore
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Foote's flotilla of iron-clad batteries and steam rams. In
those regions the war assumed quite a new character. So
long as they were carried on only by water the operations
were verv rapid. The enemy could not intercept the magniticent navigable highways so favorable to attack which the
dreat rivers of the West supplied. By water Columbus »as
besieged, whilst by quickly ascending the Tennessee and Cum
berland rivers, the communications ot the rebel army assigned
to the defence of that important post, were cut. Once isolated
from its railroads, that army had to retreat southwards. It
thus retired from position to position, as fast as the Northern
flotilla descended the river, and as the Northern army seized
upon the princip.nl railroad branches. The march of the
Fcdertds only slackened when, being able to advance no far
ther by navigable waters, parallel to the Mississippi, such as
the Tennessee, they had to reconstruct, as they went along,
the railroads necessary for their supplies, which the enemy
had destroyed in falling back.
'Ihe last operation remained—to drive out of Richmond the
insurrectionary government. That government, on being
concentrated in the hands of H1'- Ravis, took the form of a
dictatorship, and thus gave to its seat the inwortanee of a
capital. There converge all the great railroad and telegraph
lines. Thence, for a year past, have all orders and despatches
been dated. To force the Confederate government to abandon
that capital would be to inilict upon it an immense check—in
the eyes of Europe particularly it would have taken away its
prestige. Should this attack have been ventured on as soon
as the means supposed to be sudicient were provided, without
awaiting the results of the blockade and of the Mississippi
campaign t On this question opinions were di?ided. Some
■ aid " yes," arguing tbus : that an insurrection should never
be gi en the lime to establish itself; that till Federal army,
with its defective organization, would be no better in March
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than in November; that a splendid success on the part of the
North, following close upon Bull Run, miglr. finish the war at
one blow, by permitting a great effort at conciliation be
fore either side became too much embittered. Others said
“ no.” According to them the great work of reducing the
insurrection should be performed on the coast and on the
Mississippi. The Richmond campaign, undertaken in the
spring, with the Army of the Potomac, made hardier by a
winter passed in tents, and recovered from the fatal impressions
of Bull Run, would be the coup de grace to Secession. The
latter course was chosen, either as the result of real delibera
tion, or of necessity from not having decided in time to act
during the fine weather of the autumn of 1861.
And here I may point out, in passing, a characteristic trait
of the American people—that is, as well in regard to the peo
ple as to an agglomeration of individuals—delay. This delay
in resolving and acting, so opposed to the promptitude, the
decision, the audacity to which the American, considered as
an individual, had accustomed us, is an inexplicable phen
omenon which always causes me the greatest astonishment.
Is it the abuse of the individual initiative that kills the
collective energy ? Is it the habit of calculating only on one’s
self and of acting only for one’s self that renders them hesi
tating and distrustful when they must act with the assist
ance of others? Is it the never having learned to obey that
makes it so difficult to command ? Doubtless something of
all these causes, and other causes still that escape us, must com
bine in producing this result, as strange as it is unaccountable ;
but this delay in action which, besides, appears to belong to the
Anglo-Saxon race, is atoned for by a tenacity and a persever
ance which failure does not discourage.
Let us, then, leave the federal fleets occupied in blockading
the rebel coast, in recapturing Now Orleans, in aiding General
Halleck to reconquer the course of the Mississippi, and let us
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follow the career of the Army of the Potomac, destined to en
gage the great confederate army and to wrest from it, if pos
sible, the pos-ession of the Virginian capital. The winter had
passed, for the Northern soldiers, in the work of organization,
of drilling, of provisioning; besides, they had constructed
around \\ ashington a series of works, of detached forts (to use
a well known expressia a) which, armed with powerful artillery,
would protect the capital from a sudden assault, even though
the Armv of the Potomac might be absent. The construction
of these works furnished scope for thought to those who sought
to penetrate the projects <i»f the General; but everything had
long been so quiet at Washington that it was only casually
that the idea of entering on a campaign presented itself.
T'hc enemy still occupied, in great force, his positions of Ma
nassas and Centreville, and for six months past nothing but un
important skirmishes had occurred between the two armies.
'I hings were in this condition when, on the evening of the 9th
of March, one of my friends, tapping me on the shoulder,
said : " Yon don’t know the news ? The enemy has evacuated
Manassas. and the army sets out to-morrow.” Next day, in
reality, the whole city of Washington was in commotion. A
mass of artillery, of cavalry, of wagons, blocked up the
streets, moving towards the bridges of the Potomac. On the
sidewalks were seen ollicers bidding tender farewells to -weep
ing ladies. The civilian ]«-tion of the population looked
coldly on this departure. There was not the least trace of en
thusiasm among them. Perhaps this was due to the rain,
which was tailing in torrents.
On the long bridge, in the midst of several batteries that
were laboriously defiling across this bridge which is eternally in
rains. I met (.eneral Ve( lellan, on horseback, with an anxious
air, riding ahme, without aids-de-camp, and escorted only by
a few troopers. . Ie who could that day have read the Gen
eral’s soul would have seen there already something of that
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bitterness which subsequently was to accumulate so cruelly
upon him.
Beyond the bridge we found the whole army in motion
towards Fairfax Court House, where a great part of it en
camped that evening. The cavalry pushed on as far as Cen
treville and Manassas, which it found abandoned. The enemy
was not come up with anywhere; he had had too greatly the
start of us. The head-quarters were established , as well as
possible at Fairfax, a pretty village, with large frame houses
standing apart and surrounded by gardens. The population
had fled at our approach, almost without an exception. The
next day I accompanied a cavalry reconnoissance to Centre
ville, where I saw the immense barracks which the Confede
rates had occupied during the winter, and to Manassas, whose
smoking ruins left on the mind a deep impression of sadness.
On our return we visited the battle field of Bull Run. Gene
ral McDowell was with us. He could not restrain his tears at
the sight of those bleaching bones, which recalled to him so
vividly the cruel recollection of his defeat.
While we were making these promenades grave events were
occurring in the highest regions of the army. There exists in
the American army, as in the English, a commander-in-chief
who exercises over the head of all the generals, a supreme
authority, regulates the distribution of the troops and directs
military operations. These functions, which have been greatly
curtailed in the British army, since the Crimean war, were
still exercised with all their vigor in America. From the aged
General Scott, who had long honorably discharged them, they
had passed to General McClellan. We learned on reaching
Fairfax, that they had been taken away from him. It is easy
to understand the diminution of force and the restrictions upon
his usefulness, thus inflicted upon the general-in-chief by a blow
in the rear at the very outset of his campaign.
Yet tl'.is was but a part of the mischief done him. McClellan
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had
known, better than anybody else, the real strength
of the rebels at Manassas and Centreville. He was perfectly
familiar with the existence of the ‘’wooden cannon” by which
it has been pretended that he was kept in awe for six monBs.
Hut he also knew that till the month of April the roads of
Virginia are in such a state that wagons and artillery can only
be moved over them by constructing phmk roads, a tedious
operation. during which the enemy, holding the railways,
could either retreat, as lie was then actually doing, or move
for a blow upon some other point. In any event, had Mc
Clellan attacked and carried Centreville, pursuit was impos
sible and victory would have been barren of results. A single
bridge burned would have saved Johnston’s whole army.
Such are the vast advantages of a railway for a retreating
army—advantages which do not exist for the army which pur
sues it.
We have the right, we think, to sav that McClellan never in
tended to advance upon Centreville. His long determined pu
pose wa» to make V ashington safe by means of a strong garrison,
and then to use the great navigable waters and immense naval
resources of the North to transport the army by sea to a point
near Richmond. For weeks, perhaps for months, this plan
had been secretly maturing. Secresy as well as promptness,
it will be understood, was indispensable here to success. To
keep the secret it had been necessary to confide it to few per
sons, ami hence had arisen one great cause for jealousy of the
< lemwl.
He this as it may, as the day of action drew near, those
who siopectcd the General's project, and were angry at not
being inlormod of it; those whom his promotion had excited
to envy ; liis political enemies ; (who is without them in .Amer
ica 0 in short all those beneath or beside him who wished him
ill, broke mil into a chorus of accusations of slowness, inaction,
incapacity. .McClellan, with a patriotic courage which I havt
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always admired, disdained these accusations, and made no re
ply. He satisfied himself with pursuing his preparations in
laborious silence. But the moment came in which, notwith
standing the loyal support given him by the President, that
functionary could no longer resist the tempest. A council
of war of all the divisional generals was held; a plan of
campaign, not that of McClellan, was proposed and discussed.
McClellan was then forced to explain his projects, and the
next day they were known to the enemy. Informed no doubt
by one of those thousand female spies who keep up bis com
munications into the domestic circles of the federal enemy,
Johnston evacuated Manassas at once. This was a skillful
manoeuvre. Incapable of assuming the offensive; threatened
with attack either at Centreville, where defence would be
useless if successful, or at Richmond, the loss M which would
be a grave check, and unable to cover both positions at once,
Johnston threw his whole force before the latter of the
two.
For the Army of the Potomac this was a misfortune. Its
movement was unmasked before it had been made. Part of
its transports were still frozen up in the Hudson. Such being
the state of affairs, was it proper to execute as rapidly as pos
sible the movement upon Richmond by water, or to march
upon Richmond by land? Such was the grave question to be
settled by the young general in a miserable room of an aban
doned house at Fairfax within twenty-four hours. And it was
at this moment that the news of his removal as general-in
chief reached him ; the news, that is, that he could no longer
count noon the co-operation of the other armies of the Union,
and that the troops under his own orders were to be divided
into four grand corps under four separate chiefs named in
order of rank; a change which would throw into subaltern
positions some young generals of division who had his personal
confidence. It is easy to see that here was matter enough to
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cast a cloud upon the firmest mind. But the General’s reso
lution was promptly taken.
To follow the confederates by land to Richmond at this sea
son cf the year was a material impossibility. An incident
bad just proved this to be so. (Jem Stoneman, with a flying
column, had been sent in pursuit of the enemy. This column
came up with the enemy on the llappahannock, along the
railway to Gordonsville, and had two engagements with him
of no great importance. Then came the rain. The fords were
swollen, the bridges carried away, the water-courses could no
longer be passed by swimming; they were torrents. Stone
man's column began to suffer for want of provisions, and its
situation was perilous. In order to communicate with the
army Stoneman had to send two of McClellan’s aides-de-camp,
who hail accompanied him, across a river on a raft of logs
tied together with ropes.
Such was the country before the army. Furthermore, the
enemy was burning and breaking np all the bridges. Now
with the wants of the American soldier and the usual extrav
agance of his rations, and with the necessity of transporting
everything through a country where nothing is to be found,
and where the least storm makes the roads impassable, no
army can lix-c unless it supports its march upon a navigable
water-course or a railway. In Europe our military adminis
tration assumes that the transportation service of an army of
one hundred thousand men can only provision that army for
a three days’ march from its base of operating In America
this limit must be re<Iiiec<l to a single day. An American
army, thereibre cannot remove itself more than one day’s
march from the railway or the water-course by which it is
supplied ; mid it' the road which it is taking happens lobe
interrupted by broken bridges it must wait 1 ill they are re
paired, or inure forward without food and without ammtmi
lion. I need only add that npor (he roads which led to Rich
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monel there were viaducts which it would have required six
weeks to reconstruct.
The land march was therefore abandoned and we came back
to the movement by water. But this operation also was no
longer what it had been when McClellan had conceived it.
The revelation of his plans to the enemy had allowed the lat
ter to take his precautions. The evacuation of Manassas had
preceded instead of following the opening of the federal cam
paign. The movement by water could no longer be a sur
prise. Unfortunately it was now also to lose the advantages
of a rapid execution.
A few days had been half lost in a useless pursuit of the
enemy while the transports were assembling at Alexandria.
At last they were assembled and the order came to embark.
But here a new misunderstanding awaited the General. He
had been promised transports which could convey 50,000 men
at a time. He found vessels hardly equal to the conveyance
of half that number. Instead of moving at once, aS McClellan
had intended, a whole army with its equipage, a number of
trips had to be made. The embarkation began March 17.
The force consisted of eleven divisions of infantry, 8,000 to
10,000 strong; one division of regulars (inf. and cav.) 6,000
strong ; 350 pieces of artillery. The total effective force may
have been 120,000 men. At the moment of departure a whole
division was detached to form, we know not why, an inde
pendent command under General Fremont in the mountains
of Virginia. We shall see the Potomac army successively
undergo other not less inexplicable diminutions. But we
anticipate.
A fortnight was required to move the army to Fortress
Monroe. This point was chosen because the apparition of the
Merrimac, and her tremendous exhibition of her strength, had
made it impossible to regard the federal navy as absolutely
mistress of the waters of Virginia.
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Fortress Monroe is a regular citadel, built of stone, which
occupies the southern point of the Virginian peninsnhi, and lias
remained in the hands of the Federal Government since the
tintbreak of the war. This fortress, crossing its tire with that
of the Rip Rajis, a fort built on an artificial island, commands
the passage from the Atlantic to Hampton Roads, and thence
by the James river to Richmond, or by the Elizabeth to Nor
folk, where the Merrimac was then lying. It was in these
interior waters that the naval battleshad occurred which have
tilled such a jdace in public attention, and which exercised
upon the future of the Army of the Potomac so serious tin in
fluence. that it will not perhajis be improper to give them a
jiRee in this narrative.
1 shall not describe the Merrimac, which everybody now
knows. I will simply remind the reader that she was an old
and very large screw steam frigate, razeed to the water line,
and covered with an iron roof, inclined just far enough to throw
oil any ball which might strike her. In this roof portholes
were made for 100-pounder Armstrong guns, and for other
pieces of very heavy calibre. The bows wore armed with an
iron sjmr, resembling that of the ancient galleys. On the Sth
of March, the Merrimac, escorted by several iron-clad gun
boats. leaves the Elizabeth river and steers straight for the
mouth of the James, where lav anchored the two old-fashioned
sailing frigates, the Cumberland and Congress. Both open
with full broadsides upon the unexjiected enemy, but without
effect ; the balls ricochet from the iron roof. The Merrimac
keejis <piietly on. and at a sjieed of no more than from four to
five knots strikes her sjmr into the side of the Cumberland.
It is a singular fact (hat ths shock was so slight as to be
scarcely jiereejitible on board the Merrimac; but it had smit
ten the federal frigate to death. She was seen to careen and
down majest rally, carrying with her two hundred men of
her crew, v k >, to the last moment, worked their useless guns;
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a grand and glorious spectacle ! But in this fatal shock the
Merrimac had broken her spur. Was this her reason for not
even attempting to sink the Congress ? It is at least certain
that she confined herself to an artillery duel with the latter
frigate. Encumbered with the dead and the dying the Con
gress set her sails, ran ashore, hauled down her flag, and burst
into flames. In attempting to capture part of her crew, the
sailors of the Merrimac were exposed to a musketry fire from
the shore, and a ball struck her brave and skillful commander,
Captain Buchanan.
Meanwhile, the federal squadron united in Hampton Roads,
got under weigh to come to the help of their unfortunate com
panions in the James river: but this squadron could afford
them but little help. It was composed of three frigates, of
which one alone, the Minnesota, was in a condition to be of
any service ; this vessel was a screw frigate of the size of the
Merrimac, but she was not iron-clad. The two others, the
Roanoke, a screw fritrate which had lost her mainmast and
the St. Lawrence, an old sailing frigate, were only good to be
destroyed. Both of these vessels, after fruitless off rts to reach
the scene of action, and after partially running aground, gave
up the attempt and returned to their anchorage. As to the
Minnesota, which might have had some chance against the
Merrimac, not with her guns, but by using her superior speed
to run her aboard and sink her by the shock, she drew six
feet of water more than the Merrimac, and obeyed her helm
very badly when she had no more than one foot of water un
der her keel, and so she, too, ran aground in a very dangerous
situation. There is no doubt that if the Merrimac bad attacked
her here she would have shared the fate of the Cumberland
and the Congress. The Merrimac, probably to avenge her
captain, remained off the camp of Newport News, shelling
that and the batteries, and then returned to Norfolk, where
she went in for the night, probably intending to come out the
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next day and finish her work of destruction. But during the
night the Monitor arrived.
I mint ask to be pardoned for the familiar comparison which
1 am almt to use to give the reader an idea of this singular
vessel.
Everybody knows the cylindrical Savoy biscuits covered with
chocolate paste, which arc a principal ornament of every pastry
cook's shop. Let the reader imagine one of these biscuits
placed in an oblong plate, and he will have an exact idea of
the external appearance of the Monitor. The Savoy biscuit
stands for an iron tower pierced ■with two openings through
■which peer the muzzles of two enormous cannons. This tower
is made to turn upon its axis by a very ingenious contrivance,
in such a fashion as to direct its fire on any point of the hori
zon. As to the oblong plate on which the biscuit reposes, this
is a kind of lid of iron set on at the water level upon the hull
which contains the engine, the storage for provisions, and for
the crew, and the displacement of the bull supports the whole
structure. From a distance the tower only is visible, and this
floating tower, so novel in appearance, was the first thing
which greeted the Merrimac and her comrades when, on the
morning of the J)tb of March, they came back to give the
final blow to the Minnesota, which was still ashore, and pro
bably to work further ruin.
The two hostile ships, .Jamestown and Yorktown, advanced
first, with that, sort of timid curiosity ■which a dog displays
when lie comes near an unknown animal. They had not long
to wait, two flashes sprang from the tower, and -were followed
by the hissing of two 120-ponnd Mills. \o more was needed
to send th>- two scouts flying back. The werrimac,' also, at
once perceived that there was work ahead, and ran boldly
down to meet this unexpected adversary. Then began the
duel which has been so much discussed, and which seems des
tined to bring on so great a revolution in the naval art. From
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the first, the two titters felt that they must fight .at, close quar
ters ; but, even at a few yards distance, they seemed to be
equally invulnerable. The balls rieochetted and struck with
out appearing to leave any trace but the very slightest bruises.
Hound shot of 120 pounds, conical 100-pounders, Armstrong
balls, nothing went through. Then the Merrimac, trying to
take advantage of her huge mass, undertook to sink her enemy
by taking her violently in flank. But she could not get
sufficient way. The Monitor, short, agile, easily handled, ran
up to her, ran around her, escaped her blows with a speed
which the Merrimac, from her excessive length, could not at
tain. Nothing could be more curious than to see the two ad
versaries turning one about the other, the little Monitor
describing the inner circle, both equally watchful for the
weak point of the enemy against which to discharge at point
blank one of their enormous projectiles. “It was for all the
world,” said an eye-witness, “like the fight of Heenan with
Sayers.” So the conflict -went on with no visible results for
several hours. Once, only, the Merrimac succeeded in strik
ing the side of the Monitor with her bows; but the Monitor
whirled around under the shock like a floating shell, and a
very slight indenture left upon her plating was the only
damage caused by this tremendous concussion. The exhaus
tion of the combatants put an end to this struggle. The con
federates returned to Norfolk, leaving the Monitor in posses
sion of the field of battle. The Minnesota and the whole
flotilla in Hampton Roads were saved, the pigmy had held his
own against the giant. It, remained to be seen if the latter
would make another effort when the stakes should be more
tempting, when, instead of seeking to destroy one or two
ships of war, there should be a chance of preventing the
disembarkation of a whole army of invasion.
These were the c rcumstances in which I arrived at Fortress
Monroe. Soon the Roads were filled with vessels coming
3
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from Alexandria or Annapolis, and filled, some with soldiers,
some with horses, cannon and munitions of all kinds. Somei
s 1 counted scveiB hundred vessels tit the anchorage; and
among them twenty or twenty-live large steam transports
waiting for their turn to come up to the quay and land the fif
teen or twenty thousand men whom they brought. The reader
may judge how fearful would have been the catastrophe had
the Merrimac suddenly appeared among this swarm of ships,
striking them one after another and sending to the bottom these
human hives with all their inmates 1 The federal authorities
both naval and military here underwent several days of the
keenest anxiety. Every time that a smoke was seen above the
trees which concealed the Elizabeth river, men’s hearts beat
fast; but the Merrimac never came ; she allowed the landing
to take place without opposition.
Why did she do this ?
She did not come because her position at Norfolk as a con
stant menace secured without any risk two results of great
importance. In the first place she kept paralysed in Ilampton
Roads the naval force's assembled to join the land army in the
attack upon Yorktown : in the second place, and this was her
principal object, she deprived the federal army of all the
advantages which the possession of the James would have
secured to it in a campaign of which Richmond was the
base.
Ko doubt, if the Merrimac had gone down to the Roads and
destroyed the fleet there assembled, she would have achieved
an immense result, bur all the chances would not have been
w h her in such an enterprise. In the first place, the Morri
mac would have encountered the Monitor. Shi]' to ship sho
<lid not fear this enemy: the Monitor’s armament had proved
impotent against her armor and would prove so again ; and if
h1i<- had not succeeded in sinking the Monitor at the first shock
the had taken her measures to secure better luck the next time.
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The expedient adopted was a submarine spur of hammered
steel, ten feet long with which she would have reached the
hull of the Monitor below her iron cover. Of course the
latter floating at the water level and without compartments
must have gone down as soon as she fairly made water. But
the Monitor would have had new auxiliaries in a new conflict
When the Merrimac first came out, as she was seen to make
nothing of piercing the Cumberland and sinking that unlucky
ship, it had instantly occurred to the federate that in the ab
sence of vessels constructed like herself the best means of fight
ing her would be to employ large vessels of great speed, which
might be brought together to the number of five or six and
driven against her as soon as she should make her appearance.
The engines of these ships once set in motion, only five or six
men would be required to guide them. The men and the
ships were ready. Had the Merrimac appeared they would
have run down upon her at twice her speed. One at least
must have succeeded in striking herbroadside and would have
infallibly sunk her, for her cuirass offered no defence against
such an attack, or must have run her aboard at the stern and
deranged her screw when the Monitor would have had her at
her mercy. Other precautions had been taken. A net-work
of submarine cordage had been set at the month of the Eliza
beth river, and this would probably not have failed to sweep
around the Merrimac’s screw and paralyse its working. All
these things, but especially the five or six large vessels with
steam always up, and always on the watch like a pack of dogs
straining at the leash, had brought the confederate authorities
to reflection. For my own part, I am perfectly satisfied that
if the Merrimac had ventured into the deep water, beyond the
shoals which obstruct the entrance of the James and Eliza
beth, where her adversaries could get way upon them, she
would have gone down in a few moments. The federal officers
appreciating the importance of the object aimed at were deter
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milled to sacrifice their ships and with their ships their own
lives to attain it.
In a word, the American navy might prevent the Men mac
from coming into deep water and interfering with the mili
tary operations, of which the York river was the destined
theatre. But the Merrimac, on the other hand, stood in the
way of similar operations on the James. This was an im
mense service to be rendered by a single ship! We have
seen above how impossible it became to move forward the
army of the Potomac directly and by land upon Richmond,
when the railway lines, b} which it was to be supplied and
its different parts united, were interrupted. Here we sec the
direct road to Richmond by water blocked by a vessel, a
wreck happily rescued from the destruction of the Norfolk
nav
ard, fished up half burned from the bottom of a dock,
and transformed by hands as intelligent as they were daring,
into a formidable warlike machine. Instead of moving up the
bank of the James river to Richmond rapidly under the escort
and with the support of a powerful flotilla, here was the
whole federal army compelled to disembark under great perils
at 1 ortress Monroe in order to take the practicable but long
and round-about road of the York river. We were to be
' irced into going first to Y’orktown. an obstacle to be removed
by arms, and then into ascending the York and the Pamnnkot to the head waters at White House. From this point
where we must leave our gunboats, we were then to follow
the line of the York river railway, a road on which there
were happily no bridges, and which it was not therefore easy
to ent, mt which traverses an unwholesome region, and offers
the formidable barrier of the Chickahominy river at a few
miles from Richmond.
A sure and rapid operation was thus converted into a long
and hazardous campaign, simply because we had lost on one
point, ami for a short time, the control of the water. Every
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body had doubted the efficiency of iron-clads, and nobody
had thought much of the llerrimac before we learned what
she was. This skepticism was cruelly punished. In the West
the armies of the Union were going on from success to suc
cess, thanks to the cooperation, energy, and enterprise of the
navy, admirably seconded by the geographical formation of
the country. Here things were very different. A single suc
cess of the confederates by sea, a single blow which they had
succeeded in striking by surprise, was destined perhaps to
paralyze the whole federal army, to make it lose great geo
graphical advantages equal to those which existed in the
West, and to compromise, or at least to postpone the success
of its operations; so true is it that experience has not yet
taught even the most experienced maritime nations all that is
to be gained by the cooperation of a well-organized navy in
wars by land 1

III.
(forfrtss Conroe to ®Hrtnmsburc[.
Whilst we were thus waiting and waiting in vain for the
Merrimac, the army was landing at Fortress Monroe, now the
scene of a prodigious activity. By the 4th of April, six divi
sions, the cavalry, the reserve, and an immense number of
wagons had been landed. The General-in-Chief who had
arrived the evening before, put them at once in motion.
Keyes, with three divisions took the road which leads along
the Kinks of the Janies river. McClellan with the rest of the
army followed the direct road to Yorktown. We came at
once upon the ruins of Hampton, burned down some months
before, a la Bostopchin, by the confederate General Magru
der. We were informed that he still commanded the garrison
of Yorktown and die Peninsula. Magruder, like all the
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confederate leaders, had belonged to the regular amiy of the
inion down to the moment of the insurrection. His former
comrades, now at the head of the federal troops, were familiar
with his habits and character, and sought to infer from them
the course he would pursue. This reciprocal knowledge
which the chiefs of the two armies possessed of each other,
the result of a career begun in common in early youth at the
military school, and pursued either on the battle-field or in
the tedious life of frontier garrisons, was certainly a singular
trait of this singular war. Some people built up their hopes
of a final reconciliation upon these old intimacies, but such
hopes were not to be realized.
Another not less curious trait of the war,which appeared in
the outset of the campaign and was constantly reproduced,
was the complete absence of all information in regard to the
country and to the position of the enemy, the total ignorance
under which we labored in regard to his movements, and the
number of his troops. The few inhabitants we met were
hostile and dumb; the deserters and negroes generally told
us much more than they knew in order to secure a welcome,
and as we had no maps and no knowledge of localities, it was
impossible to make anything of their stories, and to reconcile
their often contradictory statements.
We were heH twenty four miles from Yorktown, and we
could not learn what works the enemy had thrown up, nor
what was his force within them. This was the more amazing
that Fortress .Monroe had always been held by a strong garri.'on, which ought to have been able to obtain some inform
ation or to make some reconnoissance in this direction. But
b\ a strange aberration, this fortress now become the base of
operations of the Army of the Potomac, bad been specially
sequestered from the command of General McClellan, together
with its garr-on, although the General in charge of it-was
his inferior in rank. Hence arose military suseeptibilities
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which were by no means favorable to the exchange of con
fidential eoimnunieations.
So the Army of the Potomac moved on in the dark
toward Yorktown. We were two days on the road. The
column of the General-in-Chief had passed some fortified
positions abandoned by the enemy. A few horsemen were
occasionally seen at rare intervals. No sooner had we come
under the walls of Yorktown than we were arrested by the
cannon. A few gunboats, which had appeared at the mouth
of York river, had found it guarded by some forty pieces of
heavy calibre. The naval officers concluded that they could
not pass this battery; the investment of the place by water
must consequently be abandoned. When we undertook to
invest it by land, we came upon a series of works stretching
across the peninsula, on the edge of a marshy stream, called
Warwick Creek, and high enough to make investment im
possible. The confederates had dammed this marshy stream
m places so as to convert it into a pond, and their dams, with
other accessible points, were defended by artillery, redoubts,
and rifle-pits. Abattis had been formed in front of these re
doubts and upon the opposite side of the marsh so as to
secure a wide range for the guns.
General Keyes, in trying to pass the river Warwick,
had been the first to encounter this line of defence. His
march had been very slow. The country, perfectly flat, and
covered -with marshy forests, was only traversed by a few
roads scarce worthy of the name. The rain, falling in tor
rents, unusual at this season of the year, had made these
roads, if we must so call them, completely impracticable.
The infantry could contrive to get on by marching in the
water through the woods, but as soon as two or three wagons
had made ruts in the ground, no wheeled vehicle could move
an inch. Of course all movement was impossible, for we
could not leave the wagons. The country was utterly de
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serted. Except water and food, it supplied us with nothing.
The soldiers, nmiccietmned either to long marches or to carry
their ammunition, carried but two davs’ provisions. These
exhausted, the wagons were their only resource. Then it was
that we had to make what in America are called corduroy
roads. These are made by cutting down trees of the same
size, a few inches in diameter, and laying them side by side
on the ground. All the infantry, not on duty at the advanced
posts, were employed, working up to their knees in the mud
and water, upon this Herculean labor, and they got through it
wonderfully. Here the American pioneer was in his element;
the mads were made as if by enchantment. The cannon and
the wagons came in slowly indeed, but they came in where it
seemed an impossibility they ever should do so. At night
the troops could find no dr J corner for their bivouac. They
had to sit down on the trunks of felled trees, or to construct
with logs a sort of platform, on which they snatched a very
precarious rest. I remember to have seen a general of division
whose whole establishment consisted of five or six pine
branches, one end stuck in the mud, or rather in the water,
the other resting on a tree. Here he slept with an indian
rubber cloak over his head. Marching along in this fashion,
we reached the confederate lines, which opened on us at
once with a sharp lire of artillery. AVc replied, but without
making any impre-sion on the well-defined works which
covered tin; hostile cannon. The creek had been recon
noitred and found impassable by infantry, both on account of
the depth of water and of its marshy borders, in -which the
troops would have been mired under a cross-lire of numbers
of sharpshooters, concealed in the woods and behind the cm
bankments.
'I hronghout the seven miles of the confedwtte lines we eneonnt red the t me attitude of alert, defence. Everywhere
cannon and camps. < )f course the inference was that we were
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arrested by forces apparently formidable and before a position
not easily to be carried. But this case had been foreseen. In
order to gain time, and avoid the tedium of a siege, General
McClellan had thought out the means of turning the position.
The enemy held the James, with the Merrimac and his gun
boats; the York was closed by the Yorktown and Gloucester
Point batteries. Nevertheless, by a disembarkation on the
Severn, beyond Gloucester, we might carry the latter position
and open the way of the federal gunboats into the river York.
A subsequent movement up the left bank, in the direction of
West Point, would put ns so far in the rear of the army charg
ed with the defence of the lines of Yorktown, that it would
have been in a most perilous position. This accomplished,
the confederates'must have abandoned Gloucester, and fallen
back hastily upon Richmond. The execution of this coup de
main had been left to a corps of the army commanded by
General McDowell. This corps was to be the last to embark
at Washington, and it was calculated that it ought to reach
Yorktown in a body on its transports at the moment when the
rest of the army, moving by land, should appear before that
post from Fortress Monroe.
Instead of finding it, we received the inexplicable and as
yet unexplained intelligence that this corps, 35,000 strong, had
been sent to another destination. The news was received
in the army with stupefaction, although the majority could
not foresee the deplorable consequences of a step taken, it
must be supposed, with no evil intention, but certainly with
inconceivable recklessness. Fifteen days before, this measure,
although it must always have been injurious, would have been
much less so. We might have made arrangements upon a
new basis. Taken when it was it deranged a whole system of
machinery fairly at work. Among the divisions of McDow
ell’s corps, there was one, that of Franklin, which was more
regrettel than all the others, as well on account of the troops

42

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

theinselvcs, as of their commanders. The General-in-Chief .tad
bestowed special pains on its organization during the winter,
and earnestly demanded its restoration. It was sent back to
him without a word of exj^nation, precisely as it had been
detached from him. This line division, 11,000 strong, arrived,
and for a moment the General thought of intrusting to it alone
the Gloucester expedition. But this ...tention was renounced.
Then came the reflection, that somewhere in these seven
miles of confederate intrenchinents, there must be a weak
spot.
Could this spot be found and forced, the usual result in such
cases would probably come to pass. The enemy at either ex
tremity would suppose themselves to have been turned, and
would become demoralized. If we then continued to pour a
constantly increasing force of our troops through the opening
thus made, we would probably intlict upon the army thus ent in
two one of those disasters which settle the fate of a campaign.
'This weak point, it was supposed, had been found near the
centre of the lines of Warwick Creek, at a place called Leo’s
Mill. The bottom here was firm, the water waist deep. In
front of the hostile work's was a kind of open plateau, upon
which a strong artillery force might be brought np to shatter
them. On the 16th of April, an attempt was made at this
point. Eighteen field-pieces opened tire at 500 yards on the
confederate batteries, and silenced them, and the creek was
then passed by some Vermont companies.
They advanced gallantly, carried a rifle-pit, but their am
munition had been wetted in passing the stream; they were
not support 'd, and retired after losing many of their number.
The project thus begun was, no doubt, found to present unTM'seen dilliculties, and it was at once abandoned.
1 iis operation, like that against Gloucester, not being feasL
blc, w< were forced to undertake the siege of the uninvested
fortifications of Yorktown.
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The various attempts at feeling our way had unfortunately
consumed much time, and the siege itself was to consume
much more, although it was pushed forward with great ener
gy. Ten thousand laborers, constantly relieved, were set at
work on the abattis, through the woods, roads, trenches and
batteries. It was a curious spectacle. A narrow arm of the
sea, fringed by a close and vigorous vegetable growth, made
up of trees of all kinds, living and dead, draped in vines and
mosses, wound up towards the front of our attack. This had
bieen used as our first parallel. Bridges were thrown over it,
roads had been opened on the banks among the tulip trees,
the Judas trees, and the azaleas in full flower. From this
natural parallel others set out, made by human hands and rap
idly approaching the works. The defenders kept up on all
that they saw or suspected, a tremendous fire. The shells
whistled from every side among the high trees, tore off the
branches, scared the horses, but did very little damage. No
body heeded them. In the evenings when all the squads
came in in good order, their guns on their backs and their
picks on their shoulders, the firing increased, as if the enemy
had marked the hour. We used to go to the front for this
cannonade, as if it were an entertainment, and when on fine
spring evenings the troops came in gaily to the sound of mar
tial music through the blossoming woods, and when the bal
loon which we used for our reconnoissances was floating in the
air, one easily believed himself to be enjoying a festival, and
was glad for a moment to forget the miseries of the war.
All this time the siege went on. A powerful artillery force
had been brought up, not without difficulty. Rifled guns of
100 and even of 200 pounds calibre, 13-inch mortars, were
got ready to batter the works. Fourteen batteries had been
built, armed and provisioned. If we had not yet opened a
fire it was because we meant it to be general from all sides,
and we were only waiting to get into a complete state <f pre-
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]>:irati^n. It was impossible, however, to resist the desire we
had of ti ring our 200-ponnders. These enormous guns were
Worked with inconceivable ease. Four men ■were able to load
and point them -with no more trouble than our old-fashioned
24-pounders. At three miles their fire Avas admirably accu
rate. One day one of these huge guns had a sort of duel
with a somewhat smaller rifled piece mounted on one of the
bastions of Yorktown. The curious upon our side got upon
the parapets to watch the effect of cwry shot, then whilst we
were discussing our observations the sentinel would Avarn us
that the enemy in his turn avus firing ; but the distance was so
great that between the discharge and the arrival of the ball
everybody bad time enough to step quietly down and get
under the shelter of the parapet. 9evertbcless, such was the
excellence of the firing that you Avere sure to see the enorm
ous missile pass over the very place Avhere the group of spec
tators bad a moment before been standing. It Avonld then go
on and strike the ground 50 yards in the rear, its cap Avonld
explode and it would burst, throwing into the air a cloud of
earth as high as the jet of the Avater-Avorks at St. Cloud.
These new and curious artillery experiences Avere not the
only interesting feature of this siege. In 17S1 Yorktown had
been besieged by the combined forces of France and America
under Washington mid Boehambean, and this operation had
resulted in the celebrated capitulation Avhich secured the
independence of the United States. At every step avc came
upon the traces of this first siege. Here in this decrepid
hovel Lafayette had fixed his head-quarters; there the French
trenches began ; there, again, lay the camp of the regiments
of Bourbon and of Saintonge. In other directions appeared
the still vi ible entrenchments of Boehambean, upon which
the almost tropical vegetation of the country had reasserted
it empire, Further on Awr pointed out to ns the house inhab
ited by the two commanders. Behind these same fortitica-
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tions of Y jrktown, Cornwallis and his Englishmen bad so long
withstood the assault of the allied armies. Upon yonder
ramparts the blood of our soldiers had sealed an alliance un
broken down to our own times ; an alliance to which the
United States once owed their prosperity and their greatness.
Not to speak of the emotion with which I found myself in
this distant spot surrounded by recollections of national glory;
not to speak of the interest with which I examined the traces
of scenes of war, some of the actors in which I had myself
been permitted to see, I could not but ask myself if by a strange
caprice of destiny these same ramparts might not behold the
undoing of the work of 1781, and if from the slow siege of
Yorktown, both the ruin of the great Republic and the rup
ture of the Franco-American alliance might not be fated to
come forth. The destiny of the Union was in the hand of the
God of Battles. No one could foresee his decrees; but the
Franco-American alliance, that alliance which had so well
served all generous ideas, was more plainly dependent upon
human will. Doubtless the strife before Y orktown was a civil
war, and although the federate were fighting for the most just
of all possible causes, nothing absolutely obliged France to
send her soldiers to aid them. But the sword of France
makes itself felt afar as well as nearer home, and the Ameri
cans of the North could have wished to see their ancient
allies throw their influence in favor of the side on which were
arrayed justice and liberty.
It was plain that with the powerful means winch we were
using the fall of Yorktown was purely a question of time.
Crushed under the weight of the fire about to be opened upon
them, without casemates to shelter their troops, with no other
defences than earthworks and palisades, the rebels had no
chance of prolonged resistance. Everything was ready for the
decisive blow. Not only was a terrible bombardment to be
directed against the city: not only were the choicest troops
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selected for the grand assault which was to follow the bom
bardment, but lite steam transports waited only for the signal
to pass up into the York river as soon as the place should fall,
and hind the forces of Franklin high up on the line of the
confederate retreat. A part of the forces were actually kept
on board of the transports. In a few hours they Mould have
passed over the distance which it would have taken the enemy
two days to traverse. Driven by storm from orktown, fol
lowed up step for step, intercepted on their road by fresh
troops, the army of the South would have been in a very criti
cal position, and thb Federals would have found what they so
greatly nee<Ml, a brilliant military success.
This they needed, not only to escape the serious evils with
M-hich they were threatened by a prolongation of the cam
paign ; the political was perhaps more urgent than the military
necessity. A victory and a decisive victory alone, could bring
on the re-establishment of the Union, that object of the ardent
pursuit of all American patriots who set the greatness and the
prosperity of their country above the passions of parties and
of sects. Bull Run, by humbling one of the adversaries, had
for a time shut the door upon all hopes of reconciliation. As
soon as the legal government of the country should have re
covered its ground, and proved its strength, it M'ould again
become possible to negotiate and to establish, by a common
agreement, the fraternal bonds of the Union. To secure this,
it was necessary to lose no time. The minds of men Mere em
bittering on cither side ; interests, individual ambitions, foreign
intrigues were daily exerting a more active interposition be
tween the two camps, and every delay must make the work
of’ reconciliation more ditlicult. A great success of the
federal army before Yorktown M’as then of vital importance
to the Government at Washington. Unfortunately, the con
federate leaders and generals saw and felt this also ; and like
tkidfnl men they took the best M'av of preventing it.
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In the night of the 3d and 4th of May, Yorktown and
the lines of Warwick river were evacuated. This evacua
tion must have been commenced several days before, but it
had been managed wTith great seeresy and great skill. On
the 3d, the fire of the hostile batteries had greatly increased
in intensity. The shells from the rifled guns flew in all direc
tions with a length of range which bad not before been sus
pected. The accuracy of their fire* forced us to abandon all
the signal posts we had established in the tops of the tallest
trees. The balloon itself, whenever it rose in the air, was sa
luted with an iron hail of missiles which were, however, per
fectly harmless. The object of all this was to mask the
retreat, and it was perfectly successful.
On the 4th, at daybreak, the men in the rifle-pits of the
advance saw no signs of the foe before them. A few of
them ventured cautiously up to the very lines of the enemy.
All was as silent as death. Soon suspicion grew into cer
tainty ; it w-as flashed upon the head-quarters by all the
telegraphic lines which connected them with the differ
ent corps of the army. The confederates had vanished,
and with them all chances of a brilliant victory. The impos
sibility of any naval cooperation, and the fatal measures by
which the Army of the Potomac lost the corps of McDowell,
had combined with the firmness of the enemy to prevent us
from taking Yorktown by storm. We had next spent a whole
month in constructing gigantic works now become useless,
and now, after all this, the confederates fell back, satisfied
with gaining time to prepare for the defence of Richmond
and henceforth relying on the season of heats and sickness for
aid against the federal army encamped among the marshes 01
* Note.—1 am not sure whether I ought to attribute to this accuracy an extraordi
nary fact which occurred during the siege. Some topographical engineers were
busy estimating a relief. They were perceived, and a single shot was fired at
them. The shell, fired from an immense distance, burst upon the circumferentor
and killed the officer and his assistant.

•IS

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Virginia. The federals, whose number was constantly lessen
ing, saw before them the perspective of a campaign which
threatened to become more and more laborious, diminishing
daily as ils perils increased the chances of an amicable adjnstment. Here was matter enough for serious and even for
melancholy rellection: but in war moments are precious, and
it is weakness to lo=e them in lamentations. It was probable
that the enemy was at no great distance. He could not yet
have gained any considerable start, and by throwing ourselves
rapidly upon his track we might at least come up with his rear
guard, iling it into disorder, and make sonic prisoners.
A few hours after the news -was received of the evacuation,
the whole army was in motion. Stoneman's cavalry first
crossed the intrenchments. As they passed on, several infer
nal machines, cowardly instruments of destruction, burst
under the horses’ feet and killed several men.
We had only time to cast a single glance upon the formid
able works thrown up by the enemy, upon which he had
abandoned 72 pieces of artillery ; then passing swiftly through
his deserted camps and burning magazines, amid which the
sound of sudden explosions was heard from time to time, we
took the road to Williamsburg, a small city situated upon a
point at which the Virginian peninsula, shut closely in be
tween two arms of the sea, oilers a strong and defensible posi
tion. It was upon this isthmus that we expected to come up
with the rear guard of the enemy.
Stoneman marched rapidly upon Williamsburg with all the
cavalry and four batteries of horse artillery. The infantry
followed as fast as the few and narrow roads would permit,
here were really only two of these roads—one direct from
Yorktown, the other coming from the left of the federal posi
tions. The latter traversed Warwick river at Lee's Mill, on
a bridge which it took three hours to rebuild. When Smith’s
division, which was the first to cross, had advanced a short
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distance it met a portion of the confederate army, which gave
way and fell back before it. Smith informed McClellan of
this, and the General, who thought that Stoneman might out
strip the hostile column and ent it off at the fork of the roads
before Williamsburg, sent orders to that officer to hasten his
march. Unfortunately, it was not easy to advance rapidly.
The roads, and particularly that road taken by the cavalry,
were narrow and full of frightful morasses from which it was
difficult to extricate the cannon, although the weather had
been fine and dry for several days. At any other time we
should have paused to admire the scenery of this lovely region
covered with virgin forests broken at intervals by a clearing,
and recalling by its aspect the smiling districts of Devonshire,
that Provence of England. But now we only looked upon
these forests as the hiding places of an enemy. The young
Duke of Chartres, on a scout with forty horsemen, suddenly
fell upon a confederate brigade. This was the rear guard of
the column described by Smith. The prince brought back
some fifteen prisoners and gave his information to Stoneman,
who hurried his advance to reach this column before it should
join the body of the hostile forces supposed to be at Williams
burg. Soon the fork of the two roads was reached, the one
leading from Yorktown, by which Stoneman was advancing,
and the other leading from Lee’s Mill, by which the confed
erates were retreating. But the moment that the fed
eral cavalry came out upon this fork, it was received by an
artillery fire from numerous field works erected in front of
Williamsburg. A rapid survey explained the position. As
we have stated, the Virginian peninsula narrows towards Wil
liamsburg. Two creeks or bays, the one opening out of the
James, the other out of the York, and both terminating in
marshes, make this neck of land still smaller, and form be
tween the marshes a kind of isthmus upon which the roads
from Lee’s Mill and from Yorktown debouch. To the south
4
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of (lie isthmus, that is to say in the direction of the approach
from Yorktown, the country is densely wooded. To the north,
on the contrary, that, is to say towards Williamsburg, it is
open and exhibits large fields of grain behind which the spires
and towers of the city are visible. Upon this open space, the
enemy had erected first, a considerable bastioned work, Fort
Ylagrnder. placed upon the roadway opposite the isthmus,
and then a series of redoubts and rifle-pits fronting every part
of the marsh over which it would have been possible for in
fantry to advance, lie had then constructed vast abattis in
such wise as to expose to his artillery and musketry the ap
proaches of the marsh and of the fork of the roads. It was
in the midst of these abattis that the federal cavalry debouched
upon the trot; and here it was, that they were sainted with a
shower of shells from Fort Magruder. In the space between
this fort and the redoubts, the confederate foot and horse were
drawn np in order of battle. Stoneman, seeing that the enemy
covered the fork of the roads, and perceiving that it would be
impossible for him to maintain his ground before them, under
took to dislodge them by a vigorous blow. lie threw forward
all his horse artillery, which took up its positions brilliantly in
front of the abattis, and replied to the fire of the redoubts;
and he then ordered his cavalry to charge. The sixth federal
cavalry dashed forward gallantly to meet the cavalry of the
confederates, passed d i rect ly under the cross-fire of the redoubts,
and rode into one of those fights with the cold steel which have
become so rare in these days.
Nevertheless, this was all so
much valor thrown away. The enemy did not disturb himself;
he had the ad vantages of number and position. To carry these
work with cavalry was impossible. Men and particularly
horses, began to fall. “ 1 have lost thirty -one men,” said Majoi
Williams, who had led the charge of the sixth, gracefully sal
uting General Stoneman with his sabre, with that air of deter
mination which says, “we will go a it again, butit’s of no use.”
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Stoneman then ordered the retreat. We repassed the abattis,
and falling back to a clearing about half a mile distant, there
awaited the arrival of the infantry to renew disengagement.
’Unluckily, in traversing the marsh, a gun of the horse-artil
lery got buried in the mud and could not be extricated. In
vain were the teams doubled. The enemy concentrated his
fire of shells on that point and killed all the horses. The gun
had to be left. It was the first which the armv had lost, and
the men were inconsolable. In the evening we renewed our
efforts to recover it, but the abattis were filled with hostile
sharpshooters who made it impossible to approach. The sun
was going down. The confederate columns coming from Lee’s
Mill, escaped and took shelter behind the entrenchments of
Williamsburg. As to the federal infantry, it came up very
late. The roads over which it passed had been tremendously
obstructed. At nightfall General Sumner, who had assumed
command, wished to make an attempt to carry the works.
Unfortunately it was completely dark before the troops de
bouched from the woods and the marshes, and everything had
to be put off to the next day. Upon this supervened one of
those vexatious mishaps which are too common in -war, and
of which this army did not escape its full share during this
trying campaign. The rain began to fall in torrents and
poured down incessantly for thirty consecutive hours. The
country became one vast lake, the roads were channels of
liquid mud. The troops dismally bivouacked for the night
where they stood.
Next day the battle began again, but. of course, in circum
stances unfavorable to the federals. The two roads leading to
Williamsburg were crowded with troops. Upon that to the left
from Lee’s Mill, were the divisions of Hooker and Kearney be
longing to Heintzelman’s corps—but they were separated from
each other by an enormous multitude of wagons loaded down
with baggage, and for the most part, fast in the mud. Upon
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that to the ri^ht two other divisions were moving forward
with still greater difficulty. Such was the condition of the
ground that the cannon sank over the axle into the mud. This
medlev of men and baggage thrown pelhnell into narrow and
Hooded roads had fallen into considerable disorder. In the
United States there is no such thing as a corps of the General
Stall'. The American system of “ every man for himself,”
individually applied by the officers and soldiers of each corps
to one another, is also applied by the corps themselves to
their reciprocal relations. There is no special branch of the
service whose duty it is to regulate, centralize and direct the
movements of the army. In such a case as this of which we
are speaking, we should have seen the General Staff Officers
of a French army taking care that nothing should impede the
advance of the troops, stopping a file of wagons here and
ordering it out of the road to clear the way, sending on a de
tail of men there to repair the roadway or to draw a cannon
out of the mire, in'order to communicate to every corps com
mander the orders of the General-in-Chief.
Here nothing of the sort is done. The functions of the
adjutant-general are limited to the transmission of the orders
of the general. He has nothing to do ■with seeing that they
are executed. The general has no one to bear his orders but
aides-de-camp who have the best intentions in the world, and
are excellent at repeating mechanically a verbal order, but to
■whom nobody pays much attention if they undertake to exercise
any initiative whatever. Down to the present moment although
this want of a General Staff had been often felt, its consequences
had not been serious. We had the telegraph, which followed
the army everywhere and kept up communications between
the different corps; the generals cotdd comerse together and
inform each other of anything that it was important to know.
But once on the march this resource was lost to ns, and so
farewell to our communications!
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The want of a General Staff was not less severely felt in
obtuning and transmitting the information necessary at the
moment of an impending action. , No one knew the country ;
the maps were so defective that they were useless. Little was
known about the fortified battle-field on which the army was
about to be engaged. Yet this battle-field had been seen and re
connoitred the day before by the troops which had taken part
in Stoneman’s skirmish. Enough was surely known of it.for us
to combine a plan of attack and assign to every commander
his own part in the work. No, this was not so. Every one
kept his observations to himself, nr*- from i’lu ill, but because it
was nobody’s special duty to elo ‘his general work. It was a
defect in the organization, and with the best e'emei.ts in the
world an army which is not organized cannot expect great
success. It is fortunate if it escape great disaster.
Thanks to this constitutional defect of the federal armies,
Hooker’s division which led the column on the left hand roac
and had received, the day before, a general order to march
upon Williamsburg, came out on the morning of the 5th
upon the scene of Stoneman’s cavalry fight without the least
knowledge of what it was to meet there. Received as soon
as it appeared with a steady fire from the hostile works, it de
ployed resolutely in the abattis and went into action. But it
came up little by little and alone, whilst the defence was
carried on by from 15 to 20,000 men strongly entrenched.
The odds were too great.
Hooker, who is an admirable soldier, held his own for some
time, but he had to give way and fall back, leaving in the
woods and in these terrible abattis some two thousand of his
men killed and wounded, with several of his guns which he
eould not bring off. The enemy followed him as he fell back.
The division of General Kearney having passed the crowded
road, and marching upon the guns at the pas de course, re
established the battle. The fight had now rolled from the
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«<lges of the ]>lain into the forest, and it was sharp, hr the
enemy was st rough' re in forced. The federals fought not less
firmly, encouraged by their chiefs, Hooker, Heintzehnan, and
Kearney. Kearney in especial, who lost an arm in Mexico,
and fought with th : French at the Jhtzaia and at Solferino, had
displayed the finest courage. All his aids had fallen around
him, and left alone he had electrified his men by his intrepid
ity. During all this time the part of the army massed on the
road to the right remained passive. A single division only
had come up, and the generals in command could not resolve
to throw it into the engagement without seeing its supports.
These supports were delayed by the swollen streams, the en
cumbered Bails, the shattered wagons sticking in the mud.
Hut all the while the sound of Hooker's musketry was in
onr ears. 11 is division was cut up and falling back. His guns
had been heard at first in front, then on one side, and they were
receding still. The balls and the shells began to whistle and
shatter the trees over the fresh division as it stood immova
ble and expectant.
It was now three o'clock, and the generals resolved to act
One division passed through the woods to flank the regiments
which weie driving Hookei, while to the extreme right a
brigade passed the creek on a.t old mill bridge, which the
enemy had failed Io scenrii, and debouched upon the flank of
the Williamsburg works. The confederates did not expect
this attack, which, if successful, must sweep everything befoi it. They dispatched two brigades, which advanced
r< ohitely through (he corn fields to drive back the federals.
The latter coolly allowed their foes to come up, and received
them with a tremendous lire of artillery. Tin confederates
imshaki-u, pushed on within thirty yards of the cannon’s
month, shouting, *• Hull Kmi! Hull Kim!” as the Swiss used
to shout, 11 Gransoii ! Granson ! ’’ There, however, they 'wav
ered, and the federal General Hancock, seizing the moment
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cried to his soldiers, as he waved his cap, “ Non7, gentlemen,
the bayonet!” and charged with his brigade. The enemy
could not withstand the shock, broke and fled, strewing the
field with his dead. At this very moment General McClellan,
who had been detained at Yorktown, appeared on the field.
It was dusk, the night was coming on, the rain still falling in
torrents. On three sides of the plateau on which the general
was, the cannon and the musketry were rattling uninterrupt
edly. The success of Hancock had been decisive, and the
reserves brought up by the General-in-Chief, charging upon
the field settled the affair. Then it was that I saw General
McClellan, passing in front, of the Sixth cavalry, give his hand
to Major Williams with a few words on his brilliant charge of
the day before. The regiment did not hear what he said, but
it knew what he meant, and from every heart went up one
of those masculine, terrible shouts, which are only to be heard
on the field of battle. These shouts, taken up along the whole
line, struck terror to the enemy. We saw them come upon
the parapetsand look out in silence and motionless upon the
scene. Then the firing died away and night fell on the com
bat which in America is called “ the battle of Williamsburg.

IV.

worn Miniamsburcji fa ^air (Dahs*
The next day dawned clear and cloudless. The atmosphere
had that purity which in warm countries succeeds a storm;
the woods breathed all the freshness of a fair spring .corning.
All around us lay a smiling landscape, decked with splendid
flowers new to European eyes; but all this only deepened the
mournful contrast of the battle field, strewn with the dead and
dying, with wrecks and ruin. The confederates had evacuated
their works during the night. We soon entered them and
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watched the bine lines of the federal ■antry as they inarch
ed with banners tlyiug into the town of \\ illiamsbttrg to
tlie sound of sxpl >ding magazines and caissons. Shortly after
the General's stab came in by a broad fine street, bordered with
acacias. All the sjjips were shut, lint the inhabitants for the
most part were to be seen in their doorways and windows,
looking on ns with a sombre, anxious air. The negroes alone
were smiling. Many of them put on the most grotesquely
victorious airs, or decamped in the direction of Fortress Mon
roe, that is to say, of freedom, carrying their wives and
children with them in small carts. From all the public
buildings, elmrches, colleges and the like waved the yellow
flag. They were crowded with the wounded left there by the
enemy. At the end of a broad street, we debouched upon a
handsome square, ornamented with a marble statue of Lord
Botetourt, once governor of Virginia, and surrounded by the
buildings of a celebrated college founded by the English
Government when \ irginia was a pet colony. The wounded
were lying upon the very steps of the college porticoes.
General Mcdellan’s first thought was tor the relief of all
this suffering. He dispatched a flag of truce to the confeder
ate rear guard, to request, them to send in surge'ns to look
after their wounded, promising them perfect freedom of
action. A number of these medical oilicers soon arrived,
dressed in the dull-gray confederate uniform-with the green
collar, which gave them the appearance of Austrian Chas
seurs.
This duty done, the next thing was to station sentinels foi
the maintenance of exact discipline. This precaution was
superfluous. for if I he obedience of the federal soldiers to their
oilicers is not what it should be, for the good of the service,
I ent’we io believe that no armv has ever shown more res
pect tjr non-combatants and private property. During tlio
whole lime of my [ resence with the Army of the Potomac,
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the only instance of disorder which came to my knowledge,
was the pillage of a garret filled with the finest Virginia
tobacco, which was discovered in an abandoned barn. Let
me add that the circumstances made this strict observance of
discipline particularly meritorious. The troops encamped
around Williamsburg after the battle which we have just des
cribed were for a short time in want of provisions in conse
quence of the impracticable state of the roads, and they
endured with resignation the hostile attitude of the inhab
itants who met their offers to pay in specie for food with an
unanimous refusal. After the first moment of fear had
passed, and it was evident that there was no ground for alarm,
the ladies of the town might have been seen ostentatiously
carrying to the wounded of their own party the refreshments
which could not be procured for the. wounded federals ; and
whenever, followed by their negro servants carrying well
filled baskets, they met a federal soldier on the sidewalk,
they made a point of gathering up their dressei in haste as il
to avoid the contact of some unclean animal. The victors only
smiled at these childish and ill-bred demonstrations. Other
troops in their place might have been less patient.
The General fixed his head-quarters in the house which the
confederate General Johnston had occupied the day before,
for it was no longer with Magruder that we were dealing.
Johnston is considered by friends and foe^ and especially by
his old comrades of the regular army, as a warrior of the first
rank. He is reputed to unite great personal courage with an
iron will, and a remarkable capacity for taking in a whole
battle field at a glance. With the fine intellect of Jefferson
Davis to conceive, his omnipotence to prepare, and Johnston
to execute their plans, the confederates were in good hand^, as
we very plainly saw. By holding his position for two days
before Williamsburg, Johnston had given time for his trains
and f ;• the major part of his troops to move quietly oil

58

THE ARMY OF THE FC TOMAC.

through the narrow country roads ; and notwithstanding the
rain which had educed these roads to a deplorable condition,
lie readied the upper York river two days after the battle of
Williamsburg, in time to engage the troops of Franklin, then
just disembarked, and so complete the protection of his
retreat. We were next to meet him before Richmond.
The federal tinny passed three clays at Williamsburg look
ing up tlie wounded who were scattered through the woods,
and burying the dead. The wounded were sent off by water
to the North on board of those large steamboats which are so
famous for their comfort and their elegance. Thanks to the
creeks which cut up the whole country, these boats, came up
and took the wounded almost from the battle Held. As to the
dead they were buried where they lay. On the side of the
enemy they were numerous; we counted sixty-three in a
single rille-pit. General McClellan sent a few squadrons in
pursuit of the enemy, and these horsemen had several pas
sages at arms with the rear guard. The first day many pris
oners were taken and eight cannon ; but after the second day
the retreat became orderly and the pursuit almost purposeless.
Moreover, if the enemy lost some of his gnus, he carried off
an almost equal number, captured from Hooker’s division,
which were used as trophies to kindle a zeal already some
what cooled by his long and continued retreats. The mass of
the federal troops was detained by the necessity of waiting
for provisions from Y'orktown, the arrival of which was re
tarded by the state of the roads. They came at last, and as
the line weather dried the roads np very fast, a two days’
march brought us up with the corps which had disembarked
and e abli.-hed a depot at the head of York river. The whole
army was collected around this Rint and then resumed its
march to Richmond along the Pamunkey, a navigable aflluent of the York'. Nothing cotdd be more picturesque than
this military march along the banks of a fine stream through
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a magnificent country arrayed in all the wealth (f spring
vegetation. Tiie winding course of the Panmnkey through a
valley in which meadows of the brightest green alternated
with wooded hills, offered a perpetual scene of enchantment
to our eyes. Flowers bloomed everywhere, especially on the
river banks, which abounded in magnolias, Virginia jessa
mines, azaleas and blue lupines. Humming-birds, snakes, and
strange birds of every hue, sported in the branches and about
the trunks of the trees. Occasionally we passed a stately
habitation which recalled the old mansions of rural France,
with its large windows in the roof; around it a handsome
garden, and behind it the slave-cabins.
As the army was descried in the distance, the inhabitants
would hang out a white Hag. One of the provost marshal’s
horsemen would dismount at the door, and, reassured by his
presence, the ladies in their long muslin dresses, surrounded
by a troop of little negresses with frizzled hair and bare legs,
would come out upon the verandah and watch the passage of
the troops. They were often accompanied by old men, with
strongly marked faces, long, white locks, and broad brimmed
hats—never by young men. All the men capable of bearing
arms had been carried off, willy-nilly, by the Government, to
join in the general defence. If an officer dismounted and
made his bow to the ladies, he was civilly received. The
classic cup of cold water was offered to him in a gourd fixed
on the end of a stick, and a melancholy sort of conversation
followed. Hen and women were eager for the news. They
knew nothing of what was happening; the censorship of the
confederate newspapers being complete, and the little news
they did publish not being often believed. Then the talk
turned upon the war. The ladies naturally expressed their
hopes for the success of the side on which their brothers were
enlisted; but they longed, above all things, for the end of the
war and of the incalculable evils it had brought upon the
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land.
we would reply: “whois to blame? Who
kindled this unhappy strife ? Who fired the first, gun withou
a reason or a motive?-’ They would make no answer, but
their glances would wander mechanically over the black heads
crowded in the doors of the negro huts. We never spoke of
slavery in these interviews; to utter the -word “slave” ■would
have suiliced to call up into the most amiable eyes, an expres
sion of anxiety and of hatred.
At other times we would find the white owners fled, and
nobodv left but the negroes, with whom we spoke of other
matters. I remember a mulatto woman who called our atten
tion with an air of pride to her son, a fine, bright yellow child
of some four years, with these significant words: “ lie is the
son of a white man ; he is worth 400 dollars. I began at
fifteen, and I am nineteen now. I have four already.”
So from point to point we moved along the river. The gun
boats went, first and explored the country before ns; then
came the topographical oilicers, moving through the woods,
with an escort of cavalry, reconnoitering the country, and
sketching by the eye and the compass provisional maps,
which were photographed at head-quarters for the use of the
Generals. The next day, with the In Ip of these maps, the ar
my would get. into motion, mingled in masses with its im
mense team of wagons. About one-fourth of each regiment
was occupied in escorting the materiel of the corps, piled up,
provisions, ammunition, tents and furniture on wagons, at the
rate of ten to a battalion. But for the absence of women, we
might have been taken for an armed emigration, rather than
for soldiers on the march.
Tin- fighting force marched by brigades, followed by their
baggage, and these long files of wagons each drawn by four
hor.-es or six mules, ami driven by a single postilion, made
the army stretch upon these narrow forest paths over an im
mense space of country, Hence followed delays equally im
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mense; for long marches could not have been made without
leaving the rear of the columns broken and scattered in the
woods by night. Six miles was the extreme limit of onr day’s
march. Sometimes we may have done better; detached corps
relieved of all impediments made some long day’s marches, but
these were exceptions. The troops were in excellent condition.
The men were vigorous, strong and intelligent in appearance.
The uniform of the whole army was the same; light blue
trousers, commonly tucked into the boots, and a blouse or
jacket or short tunic of dark blue. Some red mark on the
dress distinguished the artillery, a touch of yellow the cav
alry. The common head-dress was the ktipi, but many wore
a soft black felt hat, with gilded ornaments. The officers,
clad like the soldiers, were distinguished by small gilt straps
on the shoulder, and a purplish sash. Nothing can be more
simple, more comfortable, or more soldier-like than this uni
form when it is properly worn. In the evening, when we
came to a halt, the eamps were formed with much order and
♦regularity. The shelter-tents of the soldiers were put up in
the twinkling of an eye. The staffs planted theirs, which were
larger and more commodious. The head-quarters was fixed
in some central position, with the tent of the General-in-Chief
in the middle, and two parallel ranges of tents on either side.
The cavalry officers brought in their reports of their reconnoissances and of their constant skirmishes with the enemy.
The telegraphers brought on their wires, fastened as usual upon
posts, or enveloped in gutta percha and unrolled along the
ground from a rapidly driven wagon, which was followed by
the operators on horseback with the apparatus slung from
their shoulders. All the branches of the service were organ
ized, and the printing office worked as regularly as it could
have done at Washington.
Let us do justice to the Americans. They understand thia
camp-life better than anybody else. Their locomotive habits,
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the inniilnirity of many of them with the patriarchal specta
cle of emigrant columns moving across the Western prairies,
the nomadic life which their ofliKrs have led among the
Indian tribes, all these things lit them beyond any other sol
diers in the world for this kind of life. This encampment of a
hundred thousand men, the establishment of this city of tents,
wa^ i really curious sight, it recalled tlm descriptions of the
Bible: but there was little that was biblical in the forest of
transport ships, most of them steamers, -which came up by
water under a cloud of smoke as soon as the earn]) was fixed,
and blowing off steam with a loud noise, hauled in to the banks
and improvised wharves, which soon became scenes of extra
ordinary activity. Thousands of wasns hastened in from
every side by roads which the axe had opened for them in a
few minutes, and returned again loaded with all the com
modities required by an army: biscuit, salted meat, coffee,
sugar, barley, hay, corn. Then the sick were embarked, and
alas ! the number of these constantly increased, for the
season was at once rainy and intensely hot, and these lovely
meadows of the l’amunkey gave birth to deadly fever. Then
night would come on disturbed onl, by the tedious cry of the
mocking-bird. V ith the next morning the flotilla and the
army would resume their march, leaving behind them nature
silent, but deflowered by their passage.
On May the 16th we reached White House, a fine building
once the property of Washington, and now of his descendants,
the Lee family. The beadtif this family, General Lee, was
one of the chief officers of the confederate army; one of his
nephews was in the federal ranks. General McClellan,
always careful to insist upon respect for private property sta
tioned sentinels around the residence of the hostile general,
forbade any out to enter it, and would not enter it himself.
He planted his tent in a neighboring meadow. This respect
for Southern property has been made a reproach to the Gene
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ral in Congress; the opinion of the army did not take this
direction ; it endorsed the delicate feeling of its leader. This
feeling was pushed so far that when a general’s servants found
one day in an abandoned house a basket of champaigne, the
General sent it back again conspicuously the next by an aidde-camp. We may smile at this puritanical austerity to which
we are not accustomed in Europe. For my own part I ad
mit that I always admired it.
At White House the Pamunkey ceased to be navigable.
The York river railroad, which unites Richmond with this
river, crosses it at this point by a bridge which the enemy had
destroyed, and then runs in almost a straight line to the Vir
ginian capital. This road had been scarcely injured. Having
neither embankments nor viaducts it was not easy to destroy
it. A few rails only had been removed, and were soon re
placed ; all the rolling stock had been run off, but the federal
army had locomotives and cars on board of its transports.
The whole flotilla was unloaded at White House, where a vast
depot was established under the protection of the gunboats,
and all the bustle of a seaport soon became visible. The army
recommenced its march to Richmond, following the line of
the railway, which was to be the vital artery of its operations.
During all this time what were the confederates doing?
We have seen Johnston successfully delivering battle against
the federal advance, on the 5th of May, at Williamsburg,
and against Franklin’s corps on the 7th, at the head of York
river, in order to gain time for the bulk of his army to fall
back undisturbed upon Richmond. Cavalry reconnoissances
pushed in all directions had demonstrated the fact that almost
the whole hostile army had recrossed the Chickahominy.
Everything led us to believe that we should not meet it again
excepting under the walls of Richmond; at the same time
everything indicated that the confederates were concentratmg
in their capital for a desperate resistance.
.
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We Inui captured prisoners belonging to a corps which
had. up to this time, been stationed opposite Burnside in
North Carolina; it was, therefore, plain that this corps had
joined the army of Johnston. We soon learned the evacua
tion of Norfolk and the occupation of that city by General
Wool. It was evident that Davis could only have made
up bis mind to this sacrifice because he wished to draw
into Eicbmoud Huger and the 18,(>00 men -who had up to
this time held the great arsenal of A irginia. .Finally the
confederate leader had ordered a levy en masse of all men
able to bear arms. They had been sent into camps of in
struction. whence they would be incorporated with the old
regiments, the effective force of which would thus be doubled.
The result of all this threatened the army of the Potomac in
its only superiority, that of numbers. Unhappily, too, while
the enemy was concentrating and strengthening liis forces,
ours were melting away. We have already seen liow at
Alexandria a division was detached and sent to Fremont. Be
fore Yorktown we had lost two other divisions under Mc
Dowell. We had since left garrisons in Yorktown, Glouces
ter and Williamsburg. We had lost men under lire and by
disease, as well as by straggling. Nothing came to fill up
the gaps. When an American regiment marches to the war
it goes as a whole, and leaves behind it no depots of recruits
to restore its rank's as they arc ■wasted away.
It will be easily seen how much reason we bad to be anx
ious about this diminution of the army, while we knew that
the confederates were steadily swelling their force, and while
by plunging more deeply into the heart of the enemy's coun
try we were daily moving further from our own base of opera
tions, and losing at once the moral and material aid of the na
vy, the cooperation of which had hitherto proved so powerful
and so useful.
1 am aware that the evacuation of Norfolk was followed by
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an important event of good augury to the federal cause. Tho
Merrimac, which was no longer commanded by the brave
Buchanan, and which had now no place of refuge, was burn
ed by her new captain. Henceforth James river was opened
to the federals, but unfortunately it was opened just too late.
The iron-clad gunboats Galena, Naugatuck and Monitor, ran
up to within seven miles of Richmond : there they found the
river barred by a stockade which could not be forced, and its
lofty banks defended by a battery of heavy guns, which could
not be silenced. The great gun of the Naugatuck burst: the
Monitor could not give her cannon elevation enough to reach
the batteries of “ Fort Darling.” As to the Galena, her cuirass,
three inches and a half thick, failed to protect her against
conical 100-ponnders, and she was forced to retire, after a he
roic fight, with a large number of her crew placed hors du
combat. A land attack upon the forts was found to be neces
sary, if the passage was to be forced; but in the face of the
confederates, massed at a short distance before Richmond,
such an operation could only have been attempted by the
whole army. To accomplish it, the moment the news of the
destruction of the Merrimac reached General McClellan, he
should have abandoned the plan of campaign which he had
begun to execute, and sought the James river by a rap
id oblique march, in order to combine his operations with
those of the navy upon that river. To-day, with the added
experience of the events which actually occurred, I am inclin
ed to think this would have been a wiser course to pursue.
Of course, the passage from the Pamnnkey to the James
would have been dangerous; the passage of the lower Cliickahominy, or of the Lower James, according as it might have
been determined upon to operate up the right or up the left
bank of the latter river, would have been a difficult and delicate
ihing to attempt, with the grand army of the confederates
hanging upon the flank of the federals. Yet this risk would
5
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have been Jotter than the dismal position in which the armv
really found itself for a month in the marshes of the Chickahominy lint who conld at that time have foreseen, that at
the decisive moment of the campaign, inundations unexam
pled at that scmson of the year would thwart the efforts and
paralyze the movements of the Potomac army, as they did on
the day of the battle of Pair Oaks ? Or who, again, could fore
see that the So,000 men. assembled before Washington, would
do nothing, and less than nothing, to aid the army in overcom
ing the concentration of forces it was called upon to encounter?
We continued, then, our forward movement, and notwith
standing the almost constant rains, we were not long reaching
the banks of the Chickahominy, at a place called Bottom
Bridge, ten miles fiom Richmond, where the York liver rail
road, which we had been following from White House, crosses
the river on a bridge temporarily destroyed by the enemy.
Here we were fairly at the gates of Richmond. Down to
this time the campaign, if it had not been brilliant, had at
least been fertile in results. Yorktown, one of the most im
portant military positions of the enemy, had fallen. Norfolk,
the magnilieent arsenal from which the South drew the great
er part of its military stores had been abandoned, and the ne
cessity of abandoning it had brought on the destruction of
the formidable Merrimac. Finally, General McClellan bad
succeeded in pitching his camp without accident in front of
the capital of tlie Seceded States, and of their main army.
1 he confederates could fall back no further, without losing all
their prestige in the eyes of their partisans, and of the whole
world. They were Ilins driven to accept a decisive battle up
on this poin . In our actual circumstances, it was no slight
merit to have forced an adversary back upon such a necessity.
I know that a battle ought to have been won at this point,
and that it wa not won. But the -whole responsibility of this
matter by no means rests upon the General or upon his army.
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Who were the men, who by driving him into an untimely
campaign, had revealed to the enemy operations not yet ripe
for execution t Was McClellan responsible for that want cf
unity in the ends and in the action of the government which
had trammelled the movements of the army since he bad
been deprived of the chief command and supreme directions
of the forces? Was McClellan responsible for the systematic
diminution of his forces, which, in the face of the agglomera
tion of the forces of the enemy, had successively deprived
him, since the campaign had opened, of the division of Blenker and of two-thirds of McDowell’s corps, without sending
him one solitary man to fill up the gaps made by sickness and
by the cannon ? In spite of all these obstacles he had reached
the walls of Richmond, but he had no longer the means of
striking the great blow which probably would have ended the
■war. In a hostile country covered with forests, where one
sees nothing and knows little, what appears a simple reconnoissance may often prove a serious and general attack. There
a large force is needed to guard against surprises, and a still
larger force to secure lines of communication, which cannot
be broken without danger.
Evidently we needed reinforcements. Could we obtain
them ? Could the federals meet, with a powerful concentra
tion of troops, that concentration which the enemy had
effected, and to the reality of which the observations of our
aeronauts, as well as the statements of deserters, daily bore
witness? This was the first question we had to ask ourselves.
General Wool from Norfolk, Burnside from North Carol na,
might send some men, but very few, while around Washing
ton more than eighty thousand were collected. Of these
about one-half were making head against the partisan Jack
son in the valley of the Shenandoah. The rest were collected
under McDowell at Fredericksburg, sixty miles to the north
of Richmond. They had rebuilt the railway bridge over the
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Rappahannock, and in three or four days they might have
joined the army of McClellan. They covered nothing at
Fredericksburg, and were so notoriously useless to the federal
cause that in the confederate journals they were spoken of as
the " fifth wheel of the coach.’’ It was known that MoJJowell
desired ardently to give the lie to these railleries by bringing
at the decisive moment his assistance to the cause of the
Fnion. Accordingly McClellan had no sooner arrived before
Richmond than he undertook" to discover what he had to hope
for from this quarter. No official advices, either from Wash
ington or from Fredericksburg, had informed him of McDow
ell’s presence at that pointBmly sixty miles distant, but rumor
and probability agreed so well in placing him there that the
General-in-Chief resolved to make an attempt to establish com
munication with him. On the night of the 26th he sent for
ward General Porter’s division with a few squadrons of cav
alry, in a furious storm, to Hanover Court House, a village
about twenty miles north of Richmond, where the railway to
Fredericksburg crosses the Pamunkey. The troops of Porter
moved rapidly, and about midday on the 27th came upon the
ho~tile division of Branch, at Hanover Court House. This
thev assailed with vigor, dispersed it, and towk one of its
guns. Assailed in their turn by confederate troops who had
Hdfered them to pass by the woods in which they lay hidden,
the federals turned on their new enemies and scattered them
abo. This brilliant affair cost the federals 400 men, and left
General Porter in possession of a cannon, of 500 prisoners,
and of two bridges, one on the Fredericksburg and one on
the v rginia Central road. The advanced guard of McDow
ell was then at Bowling Green, fifteen miles from that of Fort( . It needed only an effort of the will ; the two armies were
m '< d, and the possession of Richmond certain ! Alas ! this
effort was not made. I cannot recall those tafal moments
without a real sinking of the heart. Seated in an orchard in

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

69

Hie bivouac of Porter, amid the joyous excitement which fol
lows a successful combat, I saw rhe Fifth Cavalry bring in
whole companies of confederate prisoners, with arms and bag
gage, their officers at their head. But neither the glad confi
dence of the federals nor the discouragement of their enemies
deceived me, and I asked myself how many of these gallant
young men who-snrrounded me, relating their exploits of the
day before, would pay with their lives for the fatal error which
was on the point of being committed. Not only did not the
two armies unite, but the order came from Washington to
burn the bridges which had been seized. This was the clear
est "way of saying to the Army of the Potomac, and to its chiefs,
that in no case conld they count on the support of the armies
of Upper Virginia.
This unfortunate step, had been taken upon hearing of the
successful dash which the confederate General Jackson was
then making upon the Upper Potomac. This skillful leader
ascertaining that the federal forces in that region were broken
up into a number of small independent corps, under the
orders of Generals Fremont, Banks, Shields and others, had
taken advantage of this state of anarchy to give them battle
one after another. Ue had driven Banks across the Potomac
and had created such confusion that he was supposed to be
on the point of entering Washington. With more than
40,000 men to defend that city, with the easily tenable line
of the Potomac, and the vast entrenched camp which sur
rounds the Capital it was not thought to be safe. McDowell
was summoned in hot haste to join in the pursuit of Jackson.
McDowell, as was to have been expected, arrived too late.
But the bridges which might have connected his operations
with those of McClellan, had been destroyed. It is probable
that in the confusion which reigned at Washington, the order
to destroy them was sent for the purpose of preventing the con
federates from using them to send reinforcements to Jackson.
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Hut let us turn from this afflicting spectacle ; let us turn
from -Jackson phn ing at fast and loose with the four Generals
opposed to him. He had carried his point. His daring
movement had prevented the junction of McDowell with
McClellan, at the moment when that junction would have
been decisive of the campaign. Henceforth the Army of the
1’otoinac could rely only upon itself. No time was to be lost
before acting, for every day augmented the disproportion
between the forces of the adversaries, and it was to be feared
the federals encamped amid the marshes of the Chickahominy
would suiter severely from the great heats now setting in.
We had been for some days face to face. The federal advance
was but. five miles distant from Richmond. Skirmishes were
of daily occurrence, and with the feeling on both sides a
general action was inevitable. General McClellan waited for
two things before making the attack, lie waited for the roads
which the rain had swamped to become solid and practicable
for his artillery, and for the completion of the numerous
bridges which lie was throwing over the Chickahominy.
The character of the localities, the impossibility of quitting
the railway by which the army was supplied, and the
necessity of keying on his guard against any attempt of the
enemy to turn his position, had forced the General to divide
Ins troops into two wings on the opposite banks of the river.
It was consequently most important to be able to mass them
rapidlv either on the right bank for an offensive movement
against Richmond, or on the left bank against any attempt to
turn the position. Hie hitter danger was much to be feared,
for the confederates had retained possession of several bridges
on the upper Chickahominy, yvhich would permit them to
occupy t e excellent positions that are to be found on Ilie left
bank, just so soon as the northern army should abandon
th . positions, In this way they would have shut us up
upon the right bank, blockaded, starved, and reduced to an
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extremely critical condition. Unfortunately everything drag
ged with us. The roads were long in drying, the bridges
were long in building. “Never have we seen so rainy a sea
son,” said the oldest inhabitant. “Never did we see bridges
so difficult to build,” said the engineers. The abominable
river laughed at all their efforts. Too narrow for a bridge of
boats, too deep and too muddy for piers, here a simple brook
some ten yards wide, flowing betwen two plains of quicksand
in which the horses sank up to the girths and which offered
no bearings—there divided into a thousand tiny rivulets
spread over a surface of three hundred yards and traversing
one of those 'wooded morasses which are peculiar to trop
ical countries, changing its level and its bed from day to
day, the river in its capricious and uncertain sway annulled
and undid to-day the labors of^festerday, carried on under a
burning sun and often under the lire of the enemy. And so
went by days upon days, precious irrecoverable days I Per
haps, let us frankly say it, the army was not so eager to act
as it ought to have been. To advance and meet the enemy
upon his own ground was an adventurous enterprise some
what foreign to an American army.
In that country
men affect the slow, circumspect, methodical kind of war
which leaves nothing to chance. This delay, as we have
already remarked, is part of the national character;
it is, also, to a certain extent, imposed upon the gen
erals by the nature of their troops. These troops are very
brave, but as we have attempted to show, it follows from the
weakness of the hierarchical bond among them that one can
never be sure that they will do exactly what they are ordered
to do. Individual wills, as capricious as popular majorities,
play too great a part among them. The leader has to turn his
head to see if his men are following him. Ue is not certain
that his subordinates are attached to him by the ties of disci
pline and duty. Hence, hesitation, and with it conditions un-
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favorable to any dashing enterprise. “ If we could but be
attacked and have a defensive battle,” I often heard it said,
“ the day would be half Avon.” This wish was granted. The
enemy was the first to attack'. On the olst of May he put an
end to all uncertainties and speculations as to the best way ot
gutting at him In- throwing himself boldly, with all his forces,
upon the army of the Potomac. The bloody conflict Avhich
raged on that day and the next lias received the name of the
battle of Fair Oaks.
At the time when this attack was made, the federal army
occupied a position in the form of a letter V. The base of
the V rests upon Bottom Bridge, where the railway crosses
the Chickahominy. The left arm follows tins railway and
the Williamsburg road towards Biclunond. Here lay the left
wing, formed of four divisions, echelmmed one behind the
other, between Savage’s Station and Fair Oaks, and encamped
in the Avoods on either sielc of the raihvay. The right arm of
the V folloAvs the left bank of the river. Here lay the right
wing, consisting of live divisions and the reserves. To pass
from one end to the other of these tAvo wings, one must have
crossed the river at Bottom Bridge, and the distance would
ha\le been something like 15 miles. As the ci'Oav flies, the
distance, on the contrary, was small, but the Chickahominy
floAved betAveen the two arms of the \ . It Avas to miite those
tAvo arms that three or four bridges across the river Averc com
menced, one alone of which avus lit for use on May 31st. It
had been built by general Sumner, about half way between
Bottom Bridge and the most advanced point of the federal
lines. It saved that day the whole federal army from destruc
tion. The other bridges were ready, but could not be thrOAvn
across the stream. This fact saved the Confederate army.
The strength of the enemy was thrOAvn against the left
wing The advance of this Aving lay at Fair Oaks, a station
on the York river road, and nt Seven Pines, a point on the
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Williamsburg road. Here the federals had thrown up a re
doubt in a clearing, where there were a few houses, and they
had felled trees to widen the sweep1 of their guns. The rest
of the country was one dense wood. The evening before we
had a terrific storm, with torrents of rain; the roads were
frightful.
Suddenly, about 1 P. M., the weather being grey and dull,
we beard a very lively fire of musketry. The pickets and the
advance were violently driven in ; the woods around Fair
Oak» and Seven Pines were filled with hostile sharpshooters.
The troops flew to arms and fought desperately; but the forces
of the enemy constantly increased, and he was not checked
by his losses. The redoubt at Seven Pines was suiBmnded,
and its defenders fell valiantly. Here, among others, Colonel
Bailey, of the artillery, met a glorious death among his guns.
The redoubt was carried, and the Northern troops fell into
some confusion. In vain did Generals Keyes and Naglee
make a thousand efforts to rally their troops; they were
wholly disregarded. At this moment they perceived a small
battalion of French troops, known as the “Gardes Lafayette,”
standing in good order. The Generals rode up to it, put them
selves at its head, charged the enemy, and retook a battery.
The battalion lost a fourth of its numbers in this charge, but
like genuine Frenchmen, the same all the world over, they
cried—“They may call ns Gardes Lafourchette now, if they
like,” in allusion to an uncomplimentary nickname which had
been bestowed on them.
Meanwhile Heintzelman advanced to the rescue with his
two divisions. As at Williamsburg, so here, Kearney came
up at the right moment to restore the battle. Berry’s brigade
of this division, made up of Michigan regiments, and of an
Irish battalion, advances as firm as a stone wall, through the
disordered masses which are wavering upon the battle field,
and does more, by its single example, than the strongest re-
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inforeements. Nearly a mile of ground had been lost, fifteen
gm , and the divisional camp of Casey in the advance. But
now the troops began to stand firm. A sort of line of battle
was formed across the woods, perpendicularly to the railway
and to the r >ad, and there tlie repeated assaults of the enemy
are met. The left cannot lie turned, being protected by the
impenetrable morasses of White Oak Swamp; but the right
might be surrounded. At this very moment, indeed, a strong
confederate column is moving in that direction. If it suc
ceed in getting between Bottom B.idge and the federal
troops who arc lighting at Savage’s Station, the whole left
wing is lost. It will have no retreat left, and must be over
whelmed. But exactly at this moment (six o’clock p. m.),
new actors come upon the stage. Sumner, ■who has at last
passed the river with Sedgwick’s division on the bridge built
by his troops, and who, with a soldier's instinct, has marched
straight to the cannon through the woods, suddenly appears
upon the flank of the hostile column which is trying to cut
oft' llcintzehnan and Keyes. lie plants in a clearing a bat
tery which he has succeeded in bringing up. Uis guns are
not rifled guns, the rage of the hour, and fit only to be fired
in cool blood, and at long range in an open country; they are
real fighting guns, old twelve-pound howitzers carrying either
a round projectile, which ricochets and rolls, or a good dose
of grape. The simple and rapid lire of these pieces makes
terrible havoc in the hostile ranks. In vain Johnston sends
up bis best troops against this battery, the flower of South
Carolina, including tlie Hampton Legion; in vain does he
come upon the field in person ; nothing can shake the federal
ranks. When night falls, it was the federals who, bayonet in
hand, and gallantly led by Sumner himself, charged furiously
upon tint foe, and drove him before them with fearful slaugh
ter, as far as Lair Oaks station.
Night put an end to the conflict. On either side no ono
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knew anything more of the result of the fighting than his
own eyes had seen. Friends and foes flinging themselves
down in the woods lay there, among heaps of the dead and
the dying, wherever the darkness found them. The fatigue
of this obstinate fight, as well as the shades of night, had
brought about one of those tacit truces not uncommon in war.
Evidently Johnston had imagined that by throwing his
whole force on the four federal divisions which had crossed
the Chickahominy he could crush them before the rest of the
army could come to their assistance. For the moment he had
failed, thanks to the energetic resistance of these divisions
and to the furious and unexpected onslaught of the troops of
Sumner. No doubt he counted upon the tremendous storm of
the previous night to swell the Chickahominy so as to make it
impossible to throw any bridge over the river, and to carry
away with its flood any bridge already fixed. But the capri
cious stream undid his combinations, as a few hours later it
undid those of his enemies. The effect of the deluge of rain
was not immediate. Twenty-four hours passed before it was
fully felt. Was the interval employed as profitably as it
ought to have been by the federals ? This is a question which
will always afford a matter of controversy, like so many sim
ilar questions which inevitably arise out of the history of
most great battles. It was not till one in the afternoon that
the battle began. Some time had been lost under the impres
sion that the attack on the right bank might be a feint to
draw over the federal troops while the main body of the con
federates was preparing to debouch upon the left bank. An
end was soon put to all doubts on the subject by the vehem
ence of the attack, and by the aeronauts who reported the
whole confederate army moving to the scene of action. It
was then that Sumner received the order to pass the river
with his divisions. He executed it rapidly, marching a little
at haphazard at the head of his column with no other guide
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than the cannonade, and arrived at the critical hour and at
the critical pl®. Some persons thought then, and think still
that if instead of Sumner alone, all the di visions of the right wing
had been ordered to cross the river the order could have been
executed. It is easy to see what must have happened, if in
stead of 15,000, 50,000 men had been thrown upon Johnston’s
flank. But Sumner’s bridge, no doubt, would not have suf
ficed for the passage of such a force. At midnight the rear
of liis column was still struggling slowly to cross this rude
structure against all the difficulties of a roadway formed of
trunks which slipped and rolled under the horses’ feet, of a
muddy morass at either end, and of a pitchy dark night ren
dered darker still by the density of the forest. But several other
bridges were ready to be thrown across at other points. Not
a moment should have been lost in fixing them, and no regard
should have been paid to the efforts of the enemy to prevent
this from being done. Johnston had paraded a brigade osten
tatiously as a sort of scare-crow at the points which were
most fitting for this enterprise ; but the stake was so vast, the
.esult to be sought after so important, the occasion so unex
pected and so favorable for striking a decisive blow, that in
our judgment nothing should have prevented the army from
attempting this operation at every risk. Here again it paid
Hie penalty of that American tardiness which is more marked
in the character of the army than in that of its leader. If
was not till seven in the evening that the resolution was taken
of throwing over all the bridges and passing the whole army
over by daybreak to the right bank. It was too late. Four
hours had been lost, and the opportunity, that moment which
is ever more fugitive in war than in any other occupation of
life, had taken wing. The flood on which Johnston had
vainly count J and which bad not interfered with the passage
ol Sumner, came, on in the night. The river suddenly rose
two feet and continued to rise very rapidly, carrying away
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the new bridges, lifting and sweeping away the trees which
formed the floor of Sumner’s bridge, and covering tlie valley
with its unruly waters. Nothing could cross over. With the
first light of day the battle began again fiercely on the left
bank. The enemy came on in masses without order or
method, and fell upon the federals, who feeling their inferior
ity in numbers, and having no hope of succor, attempted to
do not'ning more than to hold their own. The fight raged on
either side with savage energy. There was no shouting or
noise. When either party was too hard pressed it took to the
bayonet. The artillery from beyond the clearing sent its
shells over the combatants. Ab ! I wish that all those who
careless of the past and urged on by I know not what selfish
calculations, have lavished their encouragements upon this
fatal slaveholders’ rebellion, could have looked in person upon
this fratricidal strife. I could have asked that as a just punish
ment they should be condemned to gaze upon that fearful
battle-field where the dead and the dying were piled up by
thousands. I could have wished them to see the thousand
ambulances hastily assembled around those scattered houses.
What varieties of misery and of anguish ! There was some
thing particularly horrible in the ambulances. The houses
were too few to contain even a small minority of the wounded,
and they had necessarily been heaped up around the field ;
but although they uttered no complaints and bore their fate
with the most stoical courage, their exposure under the noon
day sun of a burning June soon became intolerable ; and then
they were to be seen, gathering up what little strength was
left to them, crawling about in search of a little shade. I
sliall never forget a rose-bush in full bloom, the perfumed
flowers of which I was admiring while I talked with a friend,
when he pointed out to me under the foliage one of these poor
creatures who had just drawn his last breath. We looked at
one another in silence, our hearts filled with the most painful
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emotions. Sad scenes, fiom which the pen of the writer, like
the eve of the spectator, hastens to turn away !
Towards noon the tiring gradually slackened and ceased.
The enemy was retreating, but the federals were in no condi
tion to pursue him. We did not then know how severe a loss
the confederates had suffered, in the person of their leader,
Johnston, grievously wounded. It was mainly to his absence
that we must attribute the disconnected character of the at
tack made upon the federals in the morning. When the firing
ceased at noon, the confederates, we were told, (for amid those
immSse forests we heard nothing and must divine every
thing,) were in a state of inextricable confusion. What might
not have happened, if at this moment the 35,000 fresh troops
on the other bank of the Chickahominy could have appeared
upon the flank of this disordered army, after passing the
bridges in safety!
Such is the story of this singular battle, which, complicated
as it was by incidents beyond human control, may yet, I think,
be taken as a fair type of American battles.* The conflict
had been sanguinary, since the Northern army had lost 5,000,
and the Southern at least 8,000 men. lint the results to either
party were negative. ThcMtonfederates, much superior in
numbers, had made a vigorous attack, had driven back their
adversaries about a mile, had captured several cannon and
had su^ied then
*,
satisfied with earning thus the right to sing
the song of victory.
The federals had had the defensive battle which they desired,
had repulsed the enemy, taken a General and many prisoners;
but arrested by natural obstacles which perhaps were not
wholly insurmountable, they had gained nothing by their sue-

• I cannot refrain from mentioning here a most characteristic incident: newspaper
wndtiTM wit- trying the latest New York papers on the battle-field during the
battle, and they tuimd buyers.
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In point of fact, both sides had failed for want of organiza
tion, for want of hierarchy, for the want of the bond which
hierarchy creates between the sonl of the General and the
great body called an army, that powerful bond which suffers
a Commander to demand and to obtain from the blind confi
dence of his troops, those extraordinary efforts by which bat
tles are won. Nevertheless, although the losses of the enemy
were the larger, the check which the federals had received
was especially disastrous to them. They had missed an
unique opportunity of striking a decisive blow.
These opportunities never returned; and moreover, in the
then circumstances of the federals, time was working against
them.

V.

Che Scbcn Chuis’ Untiles.
The day after this battle, McClellan recovered, without a
blow, the stations of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, so that the
armies were once more in the same positions as before. For
nearly a month they looked each other in the face, in a state
of inaction which yet was not repose. On the contrary, this
month, with its overwhelming alternations of heat and rain,
with the immense labors imposed upon the soldiers, with its
never-ending alarms and partial combats, was a dreary and
a trying season.
The federal army neither wished to offer, nor to invite an
other such battle as that of Fair Oaks till its bridges should be
built, and its two wings put into communication with each
other. Diluvian rains were in the way of the result. More
over, we had profited by past experience, and we wished to
give these bridges, together with a monumental solidity, an
extent of space which should traverse not only the river, but
the whole valley. If we did this, we should have nothing
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more to tear from inundations, but to do this required much
time and mans' efforts. When it was completed, the left wing
remained exposed to an attack from the whole confederate
force; so we hastened to entrench ourselves along our whole
,.ne. This was a tremendous piece of work. As in all other
places, redoubts and embankments had to be raised, rifle-pits
had to be dug, and all this under a broiling sun. We had
furthermore to cut down the trees on the site selected, and for
several hundred yards in advance. In some places no earth
works were erected, but it was thought sufficient to cut down the
forest into the contour of a regular fortification. The thickest
part of the woods left standing and salient in the midst of a
vast abattis, played the part of a bastion. The artillery and
the sharpshooters, placed in this wood, flanked with their fire
the hedges which represented the curtains.
The defenders of these new-fashioned works, it is true, had
no other protection against the hostile fire than the foliage,
through which it was impossible to draw a direct aim upon
them.
All these labors were executed with admirable energy and
intelligence. In this aspect the American soldier has no
rival; patient of fatigue, rich in resources, he is an excellent
digger and ditcher, an excellent woodman, a good carpenter,
and even something of a civil engineer. Often in the course
of the campaign we came upon a flour mill or a saw mill,
tiiriwd sometimes by a water wheel, sometimes by an engine,
which the enemy as he retired had thrown out of order. You
were sure to find immediately in the irst regiment that came
up men who could repair, refit, and set them going again for
the Borvice of the army. But nothing was so remarkable as
to see a detail fall to work at making an abattis in the woods.
It is impossible to give an idea of the celerity with which
work <>t this kind was done. 1 remember to have scon a
grove a hundred acres in extent, of ancestral oaks and other
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hard wood trees cut down in a single day by a single battalion.
Nevertheless, all this work was not done without much fatigue
both moral and material, as the natural consequence of in
cessant toil under an incessant fire.
In these vast and pathless woods, where you run a constant
risk of being surprised, it is impossible to throw out one’s ad
vance very far. So we form what in America is called a
“picket line,” an uninterrupted line of sentinels supported by
strong reserves, which never move far from the corps to which
they belong. The two armies were now so near together, and
so determined to cede no inch of ground that their pickets were
stationed within hailing distance of one another. Generally
they got along very amicably together, and contented them
selves with a reciprocal watchfulness. Sometimes friendly
communications took place between them—they trafficked in
various trifles, and exchanged the Richmond newspapers for
the New York Herald. It even happened one day that some
federal officers were invited by their confederate comrades to
a ball in Richmond, on condition that they would suffer their
eyes to be bandaged in going and returning. But a single
shot would disturb these good relations—the firing would last
a greater part of an hour, and a hundred men perhaps be
killed or wounded before they became quiet again.
At other times the troops were surprised in their tents by a
shower of shells, coming nobody knew where from, over the
heads of the pickets. This was a disagreeable reveille^ when
it happened at night. If it took place in the daytime the men
would clamber up into some high tree to spy out the spot
from which the firing came. This would be betrayed by the
smoke, and sometimes a confederate soldier would be seen
perched in some towering tree himself directing the fire of the
artillerymen. Then the federals would reply, and make great
efforts to “ bring down” the aerial gunner. These isolated an
noyances, whether of “ picket firing” or “long-range shelling”
G

82

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

troubled nobody but the troops immediately exposed. They
were happening at every hour of the day, and there is noth
ing which may not become a habit. But sometimes the mus
ketry and the cannon came booming together with a vivacity
which no one could mistake, and then every one sprang to
arms, and the staff got into the saddle. The enemy was mak
ing a demonstration in force, and we were replying. Would
a battle grow out of it?
This constant uncertainty was singularly exhausting. But
the battle never came. The Southern generals were no more
anxious than the Northern to bring on prematurely a general
engagement. They had their plans, and were leaving them to
ripen. Every day brought them new reinforcements, and they
expected still more. The whole force of the rebellion must
soon be gathered in upon Richmond. Meanwhile, disease
ravaged the exhausted soldiers of the federal army. The
extreme heat combined with the marshy exhalations generated
fevers which took ii]ion them almost instantly a typhoid char
acter. Certain divisions which had already been weakened in
action had two thousand sick upon their list. A system of
temporary and irregular leaves of absence had grown np in
the army, which also conspired to reduce its effective strength.
Many colonels arrogated to themselves the right of granting
leaves of absence for a few days to soldiers who went and
were seen no more.
It is right, however, to say that at this critical time General
McClellan received some small reinforcements. One of bis
old divisions, that <>f McCall, was restored to him. Moreover,
fortress Monroe having been at last put under hismrders, he
had drawn tlienee some 5 or G,000 men. This was something,
but it was not enough; it was far from being enough to fill
up the gaps made in the ranks, which widened daily.
These days of inaction had a further disadvantage, that
thev encon 'aged hostile partisans to dashing enterprises. The

76THU ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

83

feat undertaken by the confederate Colonel Lee was one of
the most singular episodes of the war. At the head of 1,500
horsemen he attacked some squadrons which were patroling at Hanover Court House, dispersed them and made a suc
cessful inroad upon the communications of the army. His
project was to cut off the York river railway, under cover oi
the night; but it did not succeed. We, however, had the sin
gular exhibition of a combat between cavalry and a railway
train ; the train literally charging both the hostile cavalry
and the obstructions placed on the track, escaped with the loss
of a few men killed and wounded by the fire of the enemy.
But if Colonel Lee failed to destroy the railway, he made a
brilliant razzm upon the army stores, and escaped without
damage to himself. The real mischief done was that attempts
of this sort might be constantly renewed, and that we had
not troops enough to oppose them everywhere at once.
Although under all these trials the morale of the army con
tinued to be excellent,* it was imposlible not to see that the
expedition was in a critical situation, which was daily growng worse. Having lost fully one-third of its numbers during
the campaign, decimated by disease and threatened in the
rear, the army found itself in the heart of the insurgent terri
tory, menaced by forces twice or thrice more numerous than
itself. It was impossible to think of remaining idle in front
of the enemy as had been done during the winter at Washing'
ton and more recently at Corinth. This General McClellan
felt; and as soon as the bridges were fixed he determined to
* I hardly know whether I ought to mention among other causes which might hare
affected this morale the disagreeable spectacle of the gigantic posters which an em
balmer exhibited in the midst of the camp, and in which this tradesman, speculating
at once upon the losses of the army and on the domestic affections of their friends,
promised to embalm the slain and send them home at a reasonable rate. This enter
prising rival of Gannal, by the way, saved the life of a colonel, who having bee«i
thrown into a prolonged swoon by the explosion of a shell, was supposed to be dead,
and having been committed to the embalmer, recovered his consciousness during
the operation.
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act. Apian had been thought of by him ; it was to trans
port the whole army seventeen miles from its position at that
time, to abandon the line of communications on the York
river, and to seek', with the assistance of the navy, a new base
on the dames river. If this movement could be successfully
and secretly made, the chancesofa great battle fought on the
river bank with the cooperation of the gunboats covering one
Hank of the army, would be much more favorable to the fed
erals ; but the movement had dangers of its own, and it was
not easy of accomplishment in the face of the enemy; not to
mention the nndesirablcncss of an apparent retreat.
The plan then was renounced, or at least adjourned. A ith
American tenacity, a quality which is just as remarkable
in the people as their habit of delay, and perhaps balances
that habit, it was settled that the army should not fall back, •
unless it was absolutely driven so to do. The General wished
to carry out the operations already commenced; but ho nev
ertheless took the wise precaution of sending to City Point
on the river Janies, vessels loaded with ammunition, provi
sions, and supplies of all sorts. This done, General JEcClcllan
devoted himself to bringing on a general action on the ground
lying between himself and Kichmond, a ground which he had
carefully studied in numerous rcconnoissances. These reconnoissanccs had given rise to a number of adventures. On one
occasion the General had climbed with several of his officers,
to the top of a high tree, and there, every man on his branch
with spy-glass in hand, they had held a sort of council of war.
'This took place within a hundred paces of the hostile pickets,
whom no attempt at observations could escape. We dreaded
to hoar the crack of the rilles of the famous Southern squirrel
shooters; but they were magnanimous, and the rccomioissancc
ended without a mishap. On another occasion, the staff of a
comedcrate commander appeared simultaneously with onr
own upon the banks of the Chickahominy. At once the hos
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tile gentlemen ordered up one of their bands, which played a
popular air; but it was hardly ended before the musicians
gave way to a battery, which, coming up at full gallop,
opened a terrible fire, to which we soon responded. These
examinations convinced us that the enemy was not idle, and
that he had thrown up works, armed with heavy guns, pre
cisely where we did not wish to see them. At last, after
many experiments, the battle began. On the 25th of June,
Hooker received his orders to advance a mile, to a large clear
ing on the direct road to Richmond. It was calculated that this
movement would be followed by a general resistance on the
part of the confederates, which would renew the battle of
Fair Oaks, with the important difference that our bridges
being all solidly established, we could command the assistance
of the whole army.
If the challenge were not accepted, then we should have
made one step forward; we should make another next day,
and so, by degrees, we should enter Richmond. Moreover,
we trusted to our star for the rest. Hooker, mounted on a
white horse, which made Win conspicuous in the woods to all
of us and to the enemy, advanced gallantly. The ground he
was to conquer was taken, lost, retaken and finally held by
him, with a loss of from 400 to 500 men. His two brave
brigadiers, Groves and Sickles, gave him the most energetic
assistance; but during the conflict, serious news had reached
us.
Deserters, runaway negroes, the Washington telegraph it
self, generally so sober in its information, agreed in this news:
numerous reinforcements had reached Richmond from the
South. Beauregard, set free by the cessation of operations in
the Southwest, had brought the aid of his capacity and of his
prestige to the pro-slavery cause. Jackson, leaving the eighty
thousand defenders of Washington breathless from their idle
chase after him, had completed the concentration of the whole
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Southern army. Ills advance was already at Hanover Court
House, and liis corps, increased by Whiting's division, was
estimated al 30,000 men.
The federal attack upon Richmond could no longer bo
prosecuted ; the presence » f Jackson at Hanover Court House
proved that he intended to attack our communications, and
cut them olf by seizing the York river railway. The manoeu
vre was soon put beyond a doubt. A considerable body of
troops were seen to leave Richmond, move in the direction of
Jackson, and execute that movement to turn us, the danger
of which we have already pointed out. Profiting by his nu
merical superiority, the enemy offered us battle on both sides
of the river at once.
All the chances of success were in his favor. Let the reader
recall the figure V which we used in describing the battle of
Fair Oaks. The situation of the army of McClellan is the
same now as then, excepting that the two arms of the V are
now connected by bridges, which offer all necessary facilities
for transporting the different corps rapidly from one bank of
the river to the other. The federal main body, composed of
eight divisions, but considerably reduced in effective strength,
is upon the left arm of the V—the right bank, that is, of tbo
Chickahominy, and occupies the entrenchments which front
Richmond. Before these troops lies the mass of the hostile
army, also established in entrenched positions. Upon the
right arm of the V, or the left bank of the river, lies the fede
ral General Fitz, John Porter, with two di visions and the regu
lar reserves. Against him it was that Jackson inarched with
the corps oi' General Hill from Richmond, the whole being
under the orders of General Lee, who had. succeeded Johnston
in the chief command.
Substantially, then, the Army of the Potomac was about to
engage two armies each eepud in force to itself Battles have
sometimes been won in such circumstances. But no one should
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count upon such favors from fortune. The best thing to be
done Atiis to get well out of so critical a position. There was
nothing for it but to retreat promptly; unluckily, however,
this was not to be so easily done. We had a choice of dangers.
To concentrate on the left bank of the Chickahominy was to
abandon the enterprise against Richmond, and to risk a dis
astrous retreat upon White House and Yorktown, with the
whole confederate army at our heels, in a country where we
could hope for uo support. There was no good to be expected
from this plan. To pass to the right bank was to risk the ene
my’s cutting our communications with White Honde, and seiz
ing the railway which brought our supplies. We should then
be forced to open new communications with the James river,
and to move in that direction en
and with no delay.
This would be a retreat, but for a few miles only, and if we
were but moderately reinforced, with the support of the navy,
we could reassume the offensive either against Richmond
itself, on the right bank of the river, or against Petersburg on
the left, the fall of that place involving the fall of Richmond
McClellan chose the latter course.
As we have said, he had long considered it as one of the
necessities of his position, and had even taken some contingent
steps in regard to it, the wisdom of which was about to be
signally vindicated; but there was a vast difference between
making this retreat at one’s own time and by a free, spontane
ous movement, and making it hastily under the threatening
pressure of two hostile armies. But there was no time for de
liberation. The resolution taken upon the spur of the moment
must be carried at once into effect. The distance from Fair
Oaks to the James river was not great; it was but seventeen
miles. But the stores and baggage had to be moved upon a
single road, exposed in front to the enemy, who by several
different roads radiating from Richmond could throw a con
siderable force upon several different points at once. The
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speed with which the operation was conducted upset his
calculations: he probably supposed that we should feel the
ground before we acted, and perhaps be thought that McClel
lan would find it hard to make up his mind to abandon his
lines at White House. He acted at least as if this were his
view. The troops of General Hill, mentioned above, having
crossed the Chiekahominy at "Meadow Bridge on the 26th, the
dav after the affair -with Hooker, in the afternoon attacked
the troops of McCall, the advance of Porter on the left bank.
Thisfirsi i-ontliet was very severe; but McCall occupied a strong
position at Beaver Bam. a sort of ravine bordered with beau
tiful catalpa tree.-, then in flower. There he had made abattis
and thrown up some earth »o that he could not be overcome,
notwithstanding the length of the fight which lasted until
nightfall. This vigorous resistance compelled the enemy to
throw numerous reinforcements across the river. This was
exactly what General McClellan desired, liis intention was
to fix the attention of the enemy here while on the right bank
he prepared bis movement to the James river.
The night was spent in ]mssing over to this bank the whole
of Porter's baggage and uniting it with the long train which
was to set out in the evening of the 27th. The orders were
given to re-embark or destroy all the stores and magazines
along tin railway toAVhite House and to evacuate that depot,
general Stoneman with a flying column was changed with the
execution of this order. He was to delay the advance of the
enemy and fall back when he had done bis duty upon York
town. All this was carried out exactly. Xt daybreak on the
27111. McCall muis ordered to fall back on the bridges thrown
across the Chickahominy at Gaines's Mill. Followed up rap
idly, as he had expected to be, he joined the other troops of
Porter’s corps, the divi.-ioii of Morell and the regulars com
manded by (tenoral Sykes. Porter’s duty, demanding as
uiueh self-possession as vigor, was to make a stand in front of
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the Dridges in order to give the army time to accomplish its
general movement. He was not to cross the bridges till the
evening of the 27th, and was then to destroy them. His three
divisions were attacked early in the day. The corps of Jack
son coining in from Hanover Court House, took part in the
action. The battle was fought in a rolling country, extensively
wooded, but upon certain points open and cleared. The strug
gle was arduous; the federals resisted with success; there
was even one moment at which Porter might have thought
himself victorious. This would have been a great advantage,
and might have profoundly modified the position. Accord
ingly, during this moment of hope, McClellan hastened to throw
upon the left bank all the troops not absolutely necessary to
guard the lines in front of Richmond. One division, that of
Slocum, crossed the bridges before four o’clock and joined in
the action. Another, Richardson’s, reached the scene only at
nightfall. At the moment when these reinforcements began
to take part in the fight, the scene had an imposing character of
grandeur. We had 35,000 men engaged, a part in the woods,
a part in the plain, forming a line a mile and a half long. A
numerous artillery thundered upon every side. In the valley
of the Chickahominy the lancers with floating pennons were
stationed as a reserve ; and this whole animated picture of the
battle was set in a picturesque landscape illuminated by the
last rays of the sun going down below a horizon as crimson as
blood. Suddenly the volleys became extraordinarily intense.
The reserves, which had till now been lying in the hollows,
were called up, excited by shouts, and sent into the woods.
The musketry becomes more and more violent, and rolls away
toward the left. There can no longer be any doubt that the
enemy is making a final effort on that side. The reserves are
all engaged, there is not a disposable man left. It is six
o’clock, the daylight is fast disappearing; if the federal army
can hold out an hour longer the battle is won, for at every
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other point the enemy has been repulsed, and Jackson, Hill,
Lee. and Longstreet will have urged up their troops in vain.
For lack of infantry, Porter has put three batteries en potency
on his extreme left to support the troops who are there sus
taining an unequal tight; but these troops have been in action
since early morning, they are worn. out, and have tired almost
their last cartridge. Now in their turn come up the confed
erate reserves ; they deploy regularly into line against the fed
eral left which gives way, breaks and disbands. The disorder
grows from point to point till it reaches the centre of the fed
eral lines. There is no panic; the men do not fly in the wild
excitement of fear; but deaf to every appeal, they inarch off
deliberately, their muskets at the shoulder, like people who
have had enough of it, and do not believe success possible. In
vain do the generals, the oilicers of the staff, among them the
Count ol Caris and the Duke of Chartres, ride sword in hand
into the melee to stop their disorderly movement; the battle
of Gaines's Mill is lost. There is nothing left but to prevent
a rout. The enemy, indeed, was advancing on the plain still
in the same order, his infantry deployed by regiments en
echelon, and every minute he was closing in upon the confused
masses of the federals. Such is the fury of the cannonade and
the musketry lire that the cloud of dust struck up from the
ground Uoats steadily over the battle. Then came the ordci
for the cavalry to charge. I happened at this moment to be
near its position. I saw the troopers draw their swords with
the sudden and electrical impulse of determination and devo
is they got into motipi, I asked a young officer the
tion.
name of his regiment. “ The Fifth cavalry,” he replied, bran
dishing his sabre with a soldier’s pride in his regiment. Un
fortunate voung man! I saw the same regiment next dav
brom the charge of that evening but two officers had return
ed. lie was not one of them.
1 he charge failed against the dense battalions of the enemy,
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and the broken regiments galloping through the artillery and
the flying infantry in the clouds of dust only increased the
general disorder. The artillery horses were killed, and I saw,
with painful emotion, the men working with the courage of
desperation at guns which could no longer be removed. They
dropped one after another. Two alone were left at last,
and they continued to load and fire almost at point blank
range upon the enemy. Then the deepening twilight hid the
scene. All these guns were lost.
General Butterfield had made in vain the most superhuman
efforts to save them. On foot, his horse having been shot,
struck in the hat by the fragment of a shell, and his sabre hit
• by a ball, surrounded by his aids-de-camp, of whom several
fell at his side, he had tried to rally the infantry around a flag
planted in the ground. He succeeded, but only for a few mo
ments; the precipitate rush of the retreat carried everything
away. Happily, night came on, and after losing amileof ground,
the army reached the fresh brigades of Meagher and French,
which were formed in good order. These brigades sent up a
vigorous hurrah, and a few guns put anew in battery opened
their fire upon the enemy, who paused at last, cheeked by this
final and determined resistance.
As the last guns of this action were firing, we heard a lively
rattle of musketry from the direction of Fair Oaks, on the
other side of the river. It came from the confederates who
were attacking the federal works; but the attack, which was
probably only a demonstration, was vigorously repelled.
The day had been severe. In the main battle, that of
Gaines’s Mill, 35,000 federals had failed to defeat 60,000 con
federates, but they had held them in check. More could not
have been expected.
During the night the federals repassed the bridges of the
Chickahominy in perfect order, destroying them after they
had passed. They left behind them the field of battle, covered
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with the dead (for in th is tierce conflict tlie losses on both sides
had been considerable) a great number of wounded, too much
hurt to be moved, a dozen guns, and a few prisoners, among
whom was General Reynolds. The corps of Keyes, which
■was in the advance, fell back also towards James river, and
took possession of the passage of a large morass, White Oak
Swamp., which is traversed by the road the army was to take as
well as by the principal lines of communication which could be
used by the enemy to harass us.
The 25th and 29th of June were passed in sending for
ward the train of live thousand wagons, the siege train, a
herd of twenty-five hundred oxen, and other impedimenta.
The reader may judge what a piece of work this was, when
he reflects that it was all to be done upon a single narrow
road. The first day we were undisturbed ; the enemy was ex
hausted by the previous day's battle ; he seemed, moreover,
astonished and disconcerted, and did not yet fully understand
the object of the federal army. The whole of this army was
united on the right bank of the Chickahominy, whilst the bulk
of the confederate forces was upon the left bank, and the
bridges were down. To recro.-s the river, they would be
forced either to build new bridges or to fall back some dis
tance to the Mechanicsville bridge ; either of which opera
tions involved time. Mow, time was everything, and the re
treating army put it to good use. It was not until the 29th
that the southern columns came in sight of the federal rear
guard. A battle at once began, at Savage’s Station, but the
enemy were vigorously received, and after repulsing them the
federals waited till nightfall before recommencing their march,
't he last duty done Ly the telegraph the day befoB Mas to in
form us that the confederates were at White House. This
] ont they bad found abandoned. The morning of the 29th
ha«l been spent by us in destroying all that could not be car
ried away from the camps. A complete railway train, loco-
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motive, tender, and ears, which had been left on the rails was
sent headlong over the broken bridge into the river. Nothing
was left for the foe but three siege guns which could not be
moved, and which we neglected to bury. These were the
only siege guns he captured, although the story has been every
where repeated that he took the whole federal siege train with
the exception of these three pieces. The whole of that train
reached the James river in safety. Our great misfortune was,
that we were obliged to abandon so many of our wounded, not
only at Gaines’s Mill and at Savage's Station, but along the
whole line of retreat. This misfortune was inevitable. It
was only by ceaseless fighting that we could protect our
retreat, and the transportation of so many wounded men
would have required conveniences which we did not possess.
General McClellan, during the 29th, and the morning of
the 30th, remained near White Oak Swamp, urging on the
passage of his enormous train. The heat was overwhelming.
Uis aids-de-camp, continually galloping from the rear-guard
to the advance, were utterly exhausted. So long as this huge
train divided the different parts of the army we were in great
danger. But nothing disturbed the serene self-possession of
the General-in-Chief. On the 29th, he had stopped, I remem
ber, to rest in the verandah of a house by the way side, when
the mistress of the establishment came to complain to him that
the soldiers were eating her cherries. The General rose with
a smile, went himself and put a stop to the pillage. But he
could not prevent the shells, next day, from setting fire to the
house of his pretty hostess.
At davbreak on the 30th "McClellan had the satisfaction of
seeing all his troops and all his trains in safety beyond "White
Oak Swamp which was to oppose a new barrier to the pur
suit of the enemy. By the evening of the next day Generals
Keyes and Porter were in communication with the gunboats
on the James. The trains had moved upon roads pointed out
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bv the negro guides. The heads of the columns had met
nothing but small detachments of cavalry, which they had
easily dispersed. The hardest part of the work was done, but
it was to lie supposed that the enemy would renew his at
tempt to disturb the retreat. So the General took his meas
ures in time. He left Sumner and Franklin to act as the
rear-guard, and hold the passage of White Oak Swamp ; and
put Ileintzelman with the divisions of Hooker, Kearney,
Sedgwick and McCall, across the point of intersection of the
roads leading from Richmond. They protected the trains
and reached the James river at the exact moment when the
transports with provision and ammunition, and the hospital
ships which with wise foresight General McClellan had
ordered up ten days before,1 arrived from Fortress Monroe.
Meanwhile, as had been expected, Franklin and Sumner
were sharply attacked in White Oak Swamp, to whi<*li point
tlhe confederate Generals had brought a large force of artillery.
They fell back step by step. Later in the day Ileintzelman
also was attacked at the Cross-roads. Here, the battle raged
with varying fortune, in the woods. The division of McCall
suffered severely, and its commander was made prisoner; but
Hooker and Kearney, coming to his help repulsed the assail
ants with great loss. They did not however, succeed in res
cuing the General, who was sent into Richmond to join
Reynolds.
Finally, a third attack upon the corps of Fitz-John Porter
failed utterly under the combined fire of the field artillery,
and the gunboats. Porter occupied a superb position at a
place! lallcd Turkey Rend, by some persons, and Malvern
Hill In others.
This position was a lofty open plateau
sloping gradually down to the roads by which the enemy
mu. t debouch. I he left rested upon the river, where lay the
Galena, the Monitor, and the flotilla of gunboats. Tho
federal army then had nothing to fear from this side, and had
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consequently only one flank to protect, which was easily done
with abattis and field works. On the evening of the 30th all
the divisions of the army were united in this strong position,
and here the whole train including the siege guns was shel
tered. The army was in communication with its transports
and supplies. The grand and daring movement by which it
had escaped a serious danger and changed an untenable base
of operations for one more safe and sure, had been accom
plished ; but after so prolonged an effort the troops were worn
out; for five days they had been incessantly marching and
fighting. The heat had added to their excessive fatigue;
many men had been sun struck; others quitted the ranks and
fell into the lamentable procession of sick and wounded
which followed the army as well as it could, and as fast as it
could. Doubtless during this difficult retreat, there had been
moments of confusion and disorder, but of what army in like
circumstances would not this have been true? This one fact
remained unassailable ; that attacked in the midst of a diffi
cult and hostile country by twice its own force, the Army of
the Potomac had succeeded in gaining a position in which it
was out of danger, and from which, had it been properly re
inforced, had the concentration of the enemy’s forces been
met by a like concentration, it might have rapidly resumed
the offensive.
As we have said, each of its necessarily scattered sections
had for five days been called upon to resist the most furious
assaults and had done so with vigor. Now that it was as
sembled as a whole upon Malvern Hill the confederate army
also reunited might possibly make a last effort against it. So
in the night of the 30th of June and 1st of July McClellan
prepared himself for this eventuality. He put his whole artil
lery, at least three hundred guns, into battery along the heights
arranging them in such wise that their fire should not inter
fere with the defence by the infantry of the sort of glacis up
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which the enemy would be obliged to advance to the attack.
'1’he artillery lire was to be reinforced by the lo()-poundcrs
of iheBunboats which were ordered to flank the gosition. It
M as mere madness to rush upon such obstacles ; but the confed
erates attempted it. Again and again during the day of the
1st of July they undertook to carry Utlvern Hill, but without
the slightest chance of success. The whole day for them was
an idle butchery. Their loss was very heavy ; that of the
federals insignificant. This success was due to two causes.
First, to the fortunate foresight of the General, who, in spite of
numerous natural obstacles to the passage of artillery, had
spared nothing to bring his on, and next to the firmness of his
troops. Men do not make such a campaign, and go through
such experience as they had endured, without coining out
more or less formed to war. If their primitive organization
had been better, the survivors of this rude campaign, I do not
fear to assert, might be regarded as the equals of the best
soldiers in the world.
On the evening after this battle the exhausted enemy re
tired to appear no more, and the army of the Potomac took

np a position and sought rest at Harrison’s Bar, a spot chosen
by the engineers and the navy as the most favorable for de
fence and for receiving supplies. The campaign against Rich
mond had ended, without success, but not without honor.
The honor of the army was safe ; but those who had looked
to success for the early restoration of the Union under an im
pulse of generous and patriotic conciliation saw their hopes
unhappily fade away.
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political ^flections.
Here I pause. My object in this narrative has been to
describe the character of an American army, to make my
readers acquainted with the peculiarities of war in countries
so different from our own, and with the varied difficulties
against which a general has there to contend. I have related
with equal candor my good and my bad impressions. The
good which I have seen there has often moved me to admira
tion ; the evil has never Weakened the sentiments of deep
sympathy which I feel for the American people. I have also
tried to lay my finger upon the sad concatenation of blunders
and accidents which has brought about the failure of the
great attempt made to re-establish the Union. I shall not
venture to question the future upon the consequences of this
failure. They will come to light only too soon. It would be
idle and ridiculous to predict to-day the final destiny of the
combatants, to foretell which of the two will display the great
est tenacity, will prove itself, if I maybe pardoned the phrase,
to have the better wind.
One thing is certain; the failure of McClellan’s campaign
against llichmond is destined to be followed by the effusion
of seas of blood : it prolongs a strife, the fatal effects of which
are not felt in America alone; it adjourns the most desirable
solution of the crisis, the return of the States to the old Union.
I say the old Union designedly, because I am one of those
who think that if the North were beaten, decidedly beaten,
that if the right of the minority to resist by arms the decisions
of universal suffrage were victoriously established, the Union
might still perhaps be reestablished. But it would then be
reestatbshed by the conspicuous triumph of Slavery.
7
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If the federal bond were to be finally broken between the
Xortli and the South, it would soon be broken, also, be
tween the States which form the Northern Union Each one
of them would then consider only its own interests, while the
South would be more and more closely united by the power
ful bond of Shivery. It would have shown how strong it is;
would have acquired great prestige, and would exercise that
power of attraction which always goes with success and with
power.
Victorious, it would extend its grasp not only over the now
contested States of Missouri, Kentuckv, and Virginia; but
over Maryland also. Baltimore would become the depot of
all foreign commerce. The iron of England would then en
ter the heart of Pennsylvania. Who can say that this State,
the population of which perhaps dislikes the negro at liberty
as much as it does the negro in slavery, would not decide to
make its peace with the powerful confederacy in return for
the commercial protection which the confederacy would be
only too glad to offer it? For the Southern States favor free
trade only because it suits their immediate purpose. Once
masters of the situation, they would become genuine Ameri
cans again. Nt w York would follow the example of Pennsyl
vania. Commerce does not suit the people of the South. They
need some one to look alter their business. In all probability
a similar movement would affect the Western States, all whose
outlets would be in the hands of the confederates. The States
of New t ngland alone, where puritanism holds its sway, and
sla\ ry is sincerely hated, would remain isolated, and exist
upon the products of their agriculture, and the resources call
ed into being by the enterprise of their active and numerous
maritime population. AX ith the exception of six States then,
ami probably of California also, which, separated from the rest
of the world, has altogether exceptional interests of her own,
the old I nion would be reconstructed. But the ideas of tho
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Soutn would be in the ascendant. The glorification and exten
sion of slavery would be the common watchword Founded by
force of arms, the confederation would be an essentially mili
tary power. Tae slave aristocral^would have gained its
sway, would have tasted the intoxication of glory, and would
no longer acknowledge any restraint. Conservative at home,
but aggressive abroad, it would no longer be controlled by
the cool and almost British good sense of the mercantile
North. With the impulse given to commerce by the return
of peace, and therewith consequent prosperity, the confeder
acy, constituted as I describe it, would become a formidable
power, and those who desire to see, more than aught else, a
powerful State in Northern America, might give it their sym
pathies, if it had any chances of permanency.
But he?e is the difficulty. You may do great things with
Slavery : acquire fabulous wealth in a short time, as of old in
St. Domingo; call a whole population under arms, while the
blacks till the ground, and so sustain a disproportionate strug
gle such as we now see going on in Virginia: but these are tran
sient efforts, and in the long run, slavery exhausts, ruins, and
demoralizes all that it touches. Compare the destinies of two
great neighboring cities, Louisville and Cincinnati: compare
the fate of the first, notwithstanding its immense natural ad
vantages, under the enervating influence of slavery, with the
development which its rival owes to Liberty. The fate of
Louisville would be that of a Slaveholdiug Union.
The old Union, on the contrary, with its slow and prudent,
but certain advance towards gradual emancipation, would
have resembled Cincinnati. The old Union was a mercan
tile nation, furnishing Europe with the raw materials indis
pensable toher industry and offering her an unlimited market
for her productions. This nation was useful to all the world,
and whatever appearances may have been, it was not at bot
tom hostile to anybody.
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The new Union would be military and aggressive, a condi
tion of things favorable to some Powers, but unfavorable to
others: the first was liberal and pacific; the second would
have no other spirit of progress, no other system of assimilation
than the spirit of war and the system of conquest.
Such, we think-, would be the results of a Southern triumph.
If on the other hand the conflict is to be prolonged, if the
solution of this great debate is still to be delayed, then we
must look for mischief of another sort. Urged by the pas
sions and the pressure of the contest, the federal government
may perhaps decree the immediate abolition of slavery, and
may even be driven to the terrible resort of arming the slaves
against their masters; but this measure, independently of its
barbarity and violence, would be of no use to those who
should adopt it. It would bring on in the North itself for
midable dissensions more likely to help than to harm the
cause of the Secessionists.
Need I add, that in the future seen under the aspect I have
sketched, there is nothing which can meet the wishes of the
friends of American liberty and greatness? When the block
ade of the Southern coast had become complete, when the
whole course of the Mississippi had fallen into the power of
the federal navy, those friends longed for the triumph of the
kriny of the Potomac before Richmond, because it would
have facilitated a complete reconciliation on the basis of the
old Union. This triumph was not achieved ; we have seen
why ; and reconciliation such as then was desirable and possi
ble, seems very different to-day. Yet I am not one of those
who will thence infer that the federal cause is lost. Com
pared to those of the South, the resources of the North are
far from being exhausted ; and who knows all that in a day
of peril can be done by the energy of a lice people, battling
for the tight and for humanity ?
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Note A.—Page 8.
MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF THE SOUTH.

The author here repeats in his estimate of the advantages
with which the insurgent South began the war, an impression
so general at the North that it may be considered to have be
come almost an article of faith, yet which I am constrained
to believe erroneous. The “permanent militia” of the South
here alluded to existed only upon paper, like the similar militia
of the North. There were, it is true, in two or three of the
States, and particularly in South Carolina and in Virginia,
small bodies of troops maintained at the public expense for
the protection of important arsenals or other public works,
but these were insignificant in point of numbers. The “State
Guard ” of Virginia numbered not more, I think, than forty
men, whose chief duty was to sentinel the Richmond Peniten
tiary and to inspect the statue of Henry Clay on the Capitol
Square. The organization of the Southern militia was very
far from deserving the encomium here passed upon it. It was
in-truth far inferior to the organization of the militia in cer
tain States of the North, and particularly in Massachusetts
and New York. The regimental organization which had been
carried to such a respectable point of development in New
York was almost unknown in the South. A few independent
companies like the “Blues” of Richmond and Savannah, the
“Washington Light Infantry ” of Charleston, the “Washing
ton Artillery” of New Orleans, and the “Richmond Howitzers”
(101)
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were as far advanced perhaps towards an adequate prepara
tion for actual service when tlie war broke out, as any other
militia companies in the country; but it is certain that in the
whole South there were not .W many well-drilled, uniformed,
and efficient companies capable of acting together, regimen
tally, as would have sufficed to put a regiment at once on a war
footing. The Seventh and the Seventy-first regiments of New
York State Militia were bodies of men not to be matched in
the South.
The military schools of Virginia and of South Carolina had
no doubt educated a certain number of young men in the
course of the last ten years to a higher degree of preparation
for the duties of officers in the field than was brought to the
service of the nation by the average volunteer officers of the
armies first raised in the north; and I believe there is no
doubt that Mr. Davis, Mr. Floyd, and particularly Mr. Henry
A. Wise, did a great deal during the four years from 185G to
1SG0 towards accustoming the Southern people to the idea of
a more extensive military system than their manner of life
and the geographical conditions of the country had previ
ously encouraged. The “John Frown raid’’ contributed
powerfully to the success of these efforts.
But the first armies called into the field by the South were
quite as mnnilitary in organization and not so military in
appearance as their contemporaries at the North. The con
trast between the bearing .and equipment of the troops from
Ala. mchusetts, Vermont and New A ork, which I saw pass
through New York in the Spring of 18GL, on their way to
Washington, mid the army of General Johnston which I saw
at Harper’s Ferry in June of that year, might almost have
excused the hasty self-confidence with which the North rushed
into the operation of “ crushing out the rebellion.”
The author is equally nt fault in his further discussion of
this subject when lie attributes to Mr, Davis the merit o{
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having solidified the southern army by his judicious appoint
ments of officers. In point of fact the nomination of the line
fficers of the southern volunteer forces which still constitute
the great bulk of the southern army is not, and never has
been in the hands of Mr. Davis. These officers are elected
by their men ; and it was a fact notorious in Richmond at
the time of the battle of Fair Oaks that the chaotic condition
into which the southern army fell, during that fight and par
ticularly after the fall of General Johnston, was mainly at
tributable to the fact that in re-organizing the army in April
and May, a vast proportion of the best officers of the line had
been thrown out of commission in favor of others who had
courted popularity by arts un-military, and who were wholly
incompetent to the management of their troops. “ Hierarchy
and discipline ” are things of very recent growth in the south
ern army. I have heard it stated, upon respectable authority
Virginia, that at the battle of Bull Run, in July, 1861,
whole battalions of southern troops deliberately marched out
of the fight, precisely as the author describes some of FitzJohn Porter’s regiments to have done at the battle of Gaines’s
Mills.
Mr. Davis attempted, indeed, very early in the war to
assume a general authority over the troops of the States.
But he was met at the outset by the State authorities. At
the head-quarters of General Johnston, to which I made a
short visit in June, 1861, I saw for myself the difficulties
thrown in the way of the confederate commanders, by the im
possibility of their doing precisely what the author commends
them for doing. In Georgia, the issue between the confeder
ate and state organizations was made very early and very
decisively by Governor Brown. Colonel Bartow, (afterwards
killed at Bull Run,) having received a confederate commission
and raised a regiment of men, applied to the state for arms.
These the Governor refused to supply, declaring that Georgia
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should arm no troops whom she did not commission and oryanizc. lie should not prevent Bartow from going to 1 irginia.
with as manv men as chose to follow him, and when they
reached Virginia, if anybody would give them arms they
might form themselves into a regiment. But they would not
be Georgian troops. and Georgig knew nothing about them.
Colonel Bartow, raised quite a controversy over this matter,
but the Governor was sustained by the people, and Bartow’s
men (who by the wa> followed him gallantly on the field of
Manassas) were known as the “ Independent regiment.'’
Note B.—I’oge 9.
ELOYD AND THE SOUTH.

The Prince's charge against Mr. Buchanan’s too famous
Secretary, that ho sent “all the contents of the federal arsen
als to the South,” is a clean case of crexcil eundo. If the Smith
bad no positions more defensible than the character of Mr.
Floyd, its conquest would indeed be easy: but that is no ex
cuse for extravagant misrepresentations, which, if they have
any force at all, only help to relieve us of responsibilities
which we 'Hight to accept. That Floyd would have been only
too glad to send all the arms, and all the arsenals, too, of the
country to the South, is doubtless true, but there were obsta
cles in the way of either operation, and it has never yet been
clearly proved that he tMrived any Northern State of her
just quota of arms to the advantage of any Southern State.
Indeed, he is blamed at the South for not doing what he is
blamed at the North for doing; the simple fact being that he
could not possibly do it. It. was no doubt the opportunity
and not the will which he lacked. For I remember that at
Washington, in the winter of 18GO-G1, just before Floyd went
to Virginia, he did his best to persuade certain southern lead
ers into a plan for a ri. mg in Washington, or failing in that,
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for die seizure- aud removal to the South of General Scott,
lie was excessively disgusted at his inability to accomplish
an organization for either purpose.
President Davis, who detests Mr. Floyd, seized upon bis
conduct at the surrender of Fort Donelson as a good occasion
for disgracing him, and ordered him into arrest. He remain
ed for some time at his home in Western Virginia, his particu
lar organ, the “Richmond Examiner,” meanwhile grinding
forth, almost daily, imprecations upon the confederate govern
ment for its neglect of the “ great soldier who had kept Rose
crans chained to the Gauley,” and the “great statesman who
had first warned the South to expect nothing from false and
selfish England.” The Legislature of the State was finally dra
gooned into providing for him. Authority was given him
through the Governor, to raise ten thousand men, and lie was
commissioned a Major-General of Virginia. Whether he ever
raised the men or not, I do not know. He had not done so
three months ago.
I mention these circumstances, because I observe that the
“Richmond Examiner” is constantly quoted at the North, as
the representative of southern sentiment in general, whereas
it is a fact notorious in Richmond, and indeed self-evident to
any person whose unfortunate destiny has ever put him in the
way of a prolonged familiarity with southern journalism, that
the “Examiner” is simply the mouth-piece of Mr. Floyd’s
disappointed ambitions, political, military and diplomatic.

Bote C.—Page 27.
THE EVACUATION OF MANASSAS.

I

reason to believe that when the history of the pre
sent war shall come to be written fairly and in full, it will be
found that General Johnston never intended to hold Manassas
and Centreville against any serious attack; that his army at
have
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these points had suffered greatly dining the autumn and win
ter of ls6b 2; that from October to March, he never bird an
effective force of more that. 46,Olio men under his orders;
that his preparations for an evacuation were b*gnn as early
as October, IbGl, and that after that time he lay there simply
in observation.
It was the opinion of accomplished oilicers of the southern
army, that the reduction of Pichmond would never be really
attempted excepting by the valley of the Shenandoah, in a
campaign intended to cut off the capital and the army from
their connections with the west by the James river canal, and
the Virginia, and Tennessee railways; or by the James and
Fork rivers, in precisely such a movement as that which the
Prince de Joinville states that it was the intention of General
McClellan to make, had not his plans been disconcerted by
the untimely and unnecessary revelation of them to which
the Prince so delicately but so distinctly alludes. General
D. II. Hill expected the campaign of the Shenandoah, but,
it is my impression that the majority of the confederate com
manders looked with more anxiety for the final advance of
McClellan in the direction which it now appears that it was
his intention to follow. The confederate government, how
ever. scarcely anticipated any serious cainpdign from either
quarter, and amused with dBams of an early peace through
the influence of European intervention and of politico-mancial causes at the .North, kept Johnston's army in a position
of observation on the Potomac, and utterly neglected all
adequate preparations against such an expedition as the
Prim-e relates Genual McClellan to have been silently pre
paring during the winter of 1861-2. There can be little
doubt that tie completion of the Merrimac in time to close
the I ames river against our llee+s, was quite as much a matter
of chance as of design ; the Secretary of the confederate navy
ha' .ng small faith in the work, and the people at large no
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faith at all. My own impression is, that the movement of
General McClellan’s army from its demonstrations along the
Potomac to the base upon the James, selected for its opera
tions against Richmond, could it have been put into execution
as the author planned it, might well have proved so eminent
ly and brilliantly successful, as to take its place in military
history with such openings of a campaign, as Moreau's pass
age of the Rhine in 1800, and the Marshal de Saxe’s sudden
and magnificent transition from the demonstrations against
Antwerp to the operations against Maestricht, in the Flemish
campaign of 1748.

Note D.—Page 59.
CENSORSHIP OF THE SOUTHERN PRESS.

The Prince only echoes a belief very general at the North,
when he speaks of the “ Complete Censorship of the Southern
Press,” but this belief is certainly unfounded. It is a curious
trait of the existing war that every attempt on the part of the
Richmond government to exercise a centralized control over
the institutions of the different seceded States has been in
stantly, and so far as I know, successfully repelled by public
sentiment. Reporters for the press were excluded from the
lines of the Southern armies in the field early in the current
year, but this was a military measure, and was acquiesced in
as such. A tacit agreement subsequently grew up between
the War Department and the Press that great reticence should
be observed in regard to military movements. But a propo
sition to establish a formal censorship, made in January or
February, 1861, was instantly sneered and shouted down
throughout the South, and when, not very long afterwards,
the commander of the department of Henrico, Brigadier
General Winder, permitted himself to threaten certain papers
in Richmond with “suppression,” he was met with open and
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contemptuous defiance: and very prudently modified his pre
tensions wiili no unnecessary delay. "Whatever “ censorship”
exists at all in the South is a censorship of passion and not of
power.
Note E.—1’ngc

63.

RESPECT FOR SOUTHERN PROPERTY.

It is equally astonishing and unfortunate that the policy of
forbearance in respect to the property and the persons of non
combatants in Virginia should ever have been the subject of
unfavorable discussion in Congress. Aside from the abstract
question involved, and from the moral influence of our prac
tice in this particular upon the opinion of the world, it was
only necessary to read the Richmond papers to perceive how
anxiously the southern leaders desired to see us concede that
disgraceful license of plunder and cruelty to the whole army
which certain general officers of the army of the Potomac are
alleged to have put to profit, until the practice was prevented
by peremptory orders from the General-in-Chief. Confederate
officers, who served in Western Virginia, at the beginning of
the war. testified strongly, in my hearing, to the 1: bad effect'’
upon their men of General McClellan's forbearance and kind
ness towards the prisoners whom he paroled after the defeat
of General Garnett. livery instance of pillage which oc
curred during the subsequent invasions in Virginia was sedu
lously magnified and published throughout the South. The
result of all this was two-fold; it produced upon the soldiers
in the field precisely the effect which Lord Dunmore aimed at
in the early days of the Revolution, when he made the royal
troops believe that they would Go scalped if they fell alive into
the hands of the “shirtmen: and it so influenced the pas
sions of the >eople against the northern “ Hessians ” as cruelly
to increase the sufferings of onr prisoners. I ha\^Hen tho
soldiers of the guard forced to protect prisoners in Richmond
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from the insults and violence of the citizens, and it was noto
rious that any official attempt to treat the federal captives de
cently would be universally denounced as soon as it was
made public. General Lee himself was insulted in one of the
Richmond papers, because his wife had accepted the protec
tion of General McClellan for her household and herself.
Let me add that the private testimony of refugees in Rich
mond was almost unanimous as to the general good conduct
of our troops, but this was as carefully suppressed, as was con
current testimony of the same kind to the damage inflicted
upon the country people by their southern “ defenders,”
Whatever the issue of the pending struggle may be, we
ought to remember that pillage in war is after all simply open
robbery. Probably none of us would take any particular pride
in calling the attention of his guests to a silver teapot stolen by
his grandfather from a farm-house during the invasion of
Canada; and we may surely do our posterity the trivial jus
tice to believe that their respect for their ancestorswill not be
diminished by any display on our part of self-command, dig
nity, and reverence for those “ holy bounds ” of which Schil
ler sings so earnestly in his Wallenstein.

Note F.—Page 65.
OPENING OF JAMES RIVER.

The author speaks of James river as “ opened to the fed
eral navy” by the destruction of the Merrimac. This is per
fectly correct; but it may be observed that James river was
never closed to the federal navy till the Merrimac had been
launched, proved and found far from wanting. The memo
rable panic occasioned in Richmond in April, 1861, by the
news that the “ Pawnee” was coming up the river, might have
been supposed likely to point out to our own Government the
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wisdom of trying the experiment of a naval excursion from
Portress Monroe to Rocketts; and to the confederates the pro
priety of fortifying the river banks. It produced neither the
one nor tlie other effect.
A couple of war steamers sent up the James when the army
of McDowell advanced from Washington, might have neutral
ized the southern victory at Bull Run ; and I have the author
ity of a southern naval officer for saying that the banks of the
James were never adequately protected against the passage
of even a single powerful gunboat until the works at Drewry’s
Bluff were extemporized in Mav, 1S62. These works were
thrown up so hastily, and so little was known or believed at
Richmond of their capacity to resist a serious attack, that the
excitement which reigned throughout the city during the dull
gray morning of the day in which the heavy guns of the at
tack and defence were heard sullenly booming down the river,
more nearly approached a panic than anything else which I
witnessed during the whole time of my detention there.
The preparations of the governments, state and confederate,
for evacuating the cit * had been hurried forward with great
earnestness from the time when the sacrifice of Norfolk and
the Merrimac became a probable military necessity: but there
was such a conflict of councils in both governments that the
successful passage of Drewry’s Bluff would unquestionably
have brought on a tremendous general catastrophe.

Note G.—Pnge 67.
"TUB PARTISAN JACKSON.”

It is singular enough that so many even of those who ought
to be well informed in respect to the history and present posi
tion of the southern leaders should persist in writing and talk
ing of “ Stonewall Jackson ” as a “ partisan.” He is scarcely
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a “ ] artisan,” even in the political sense of that word, for he
was by no means a Secessionist in his convictions or his sym
pathies, and only joined the southern forces in the field, as 1
have been informed upon very respectable authority, from a
religious sense of duty to his native State. I do not know that
it is a greater stretch of charity to concede the possible exist
ence of an honest “ rebel ” than of an honest atheist, and if
Stonewall Jackson may be supposed to be honest, he belongs
to the not inconsiderable class of men in the South who would
draw the sword at the behest of their State as readily against
the government of Jefferson Davis as against that of Abraham
Lincoln. A partisan, in the military sense, Jackson has never
been. He was graduated at West Point with the class of 1812,
served with distinction in Mexico, and holds the rank of Major
General in the regular army of the “ Confederate States.” The
partisan service has not been popular in the South, and most
of those leaders who won their first spurs as partisans in Ken
tucky and Virginia have passed into the regular service as fast
as they could find or make room for themselves. Turner Ash
by was a confederate brigadier when he fell in battle, and
John Morgan now holds that rank, his second in command
being an experienced English officer, Colonel George St. Leger
Grenfell, who resigned his Queen’s commission and left a lucra
tive post in India, came from Calcutta to Havana, and “ ran
the blockade ” into Charleston to put his sword at the service
of the South.

Note H.—Page 6S,
McDowell’s recall from Fredericksburg.
The failure of the armies of McDowell and McClellan to
unite before Richmond surprised the confederate command
ers in the latter city more, I think, than any one incident of
the war. They had endeavored, of course, to bring it about
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though I have sonic reason to doubt whether it was the pri
mary object or expectation of “Stonewall” Jackson in his
dashing Potomac campaign to effect this result. But it was
not believed Possible in Richmond for some days after it had
demonstrably occurred. The cannon of Fitz-John Porter in
the battle at Hanover Court House had sounded the knell of
Richmond in the ears of those who knew the relative positions
of the two federal armies. I was at that time living in a house
on the extreme verge of Shockoe Hill, overlooking the line of
the Virginia Central Railway, and on the 27th of May I re
ceived a visit from an European officer of distinction, then in
Richmond, who brought me the news of what was going on,
and said to me, “You will have the first view of the Yankees
—they will march in on yonder lines;” pointing to the roads
which wound awsy from beyond the crest to our left in the
direction of Hanover Court House and Ashland. At that
time the foreign consuls in Richmond had made all necessary
arrangements for protecting the property’ of their fellow sub
jects; and almost every body -who owned any tobacco or
Hour was eager to shift it, in one. way or another, to the ac
count of foreign owners. The fall of the city was considered
inevitable.
Note I.—l’agc 72.
FA Hi O\KS.

Tim Prince's account of the condition of the confederates
on the morning of June 1st, rather under than overstates the
case. They were in a perfect chaos of brigades and regiments.
The roads into Richmond were literally’ crowded with strag
glers, some throwing away their guns, some breaking them on
the trees—all with the same story, that their regiments had
be«n Mcnt to pieces ”—that the “ Yankees were swarming on
the Chickahominy like bees,’’ and “ lighting like devils.” In
two d..ys of the succeeding week the provost-marshal’s guard
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collected between 4,000 and 5,000 stragglers and sent them
into camp. What had become of the command of the army
no one knew. By some persons it was reported that AlajorGeneral Gustavus AV. Smith had succeeded Johnston, by
others, that President Davis in person had taken the reins of
the army. General Johnston himself was supposed to be
either actually dead or dying. He had been twice hit before
he received the final wound which struck him from his horse.
In falling he had broken two of his ribs, was picked up sense
less and covered with blood, put into a hackney coach and
driven to a house on Church Hill, where, he lay between life
and death for several weeks. The roads in the vicinity were
covered with tan and all traffic interrupted by chains
stretched across them near the house which he occupied.
Had I been aware on that day of the actual state of things
upon the field, I might easily have driven in a carriage
through the confederate lines directly into our own camps.
It was not indeed till several days after the battle that any
thing like military order was restored throughout the confed
erate positions, or the last of the wounded brought in from the
recesses of the woods and the intricacies of the secluded path
ways in which they had lain dying a hundred deaths within
four or five miles of the city and its hospitals. It is impossi
ble to exaggerate the difficulties attending a general action in
such a country. One gentleman who distinguished himself
by his assiduity m seeking and bringing in the wounded from
the field, told me that on three different occasions, within as
many days, he had been forced to pass by wounded men, his
carriage being absolutely filled and he walking by its side,
that on each occasion he had noted as well as he could the
position of the sufferers, and that on each occasion when he
returned to seek for them he was compelled to give up the
search in despair, so absolutely impossible was it to identify
particular paths in that labyrinth of swamps and trees.
8
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I do not think the Prince exaggerates the losses of the
enemy in this sanguinary flight. There were published in the
Richmond papers, detailed brigade and regimental reports of
tlie losses in sixty out of seven tv-two organizations, regiments,
battalions and companies mentioned as taking part in the engogements. 1 computed these losses as they were published.
The sum total was 6,732 killed, wounded and missing. The
‘•Richmond Enquirer” nevertheless, which had published these
very lists, relying I suppose upon the arithmetical indolence
of its readers, coolly announced the entire loss of the confed
erates on the 31st May and 1st June to have been but 2,300
men! The official report was about 4,300.
As to the rain storm of May 30th, the Prince may well
speak of it as “ terrible.” Never, even in the tropics, have I
seen a more sudden and sweeping deluge. The creek which
flowed at the bottom of the hill below the house in which I
lived, and over which in ordinary times, a boy might easily
leap, tilled the valley on the morning of May 31st, with a
shallow lake more than 100 yards in width.
Many confederate officers consoled themselves for the re
sults of the battle of Kail- Oaks; or Seven Pines as it is called
at the South, by the consideration that in wounding General
Johnston, and so compelling Mr. Davis to allow the command
of the main army in the field to devolve upon General Lee,
the federals had rendered them a great service. This was be
cause the southern army under Johnston, was known to be
suffering severely in numbers and morale from the same lax
ity in organization for which the Prince, in so friendly a
spirit, finds fault with our own forces. Lee was considered, I
rhould sav, to have more of the talent essential for organizatiou than any man in the service of the South.
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NOTE K —Page

86.

THE SEVEN DAYS’ BATTLES.

The phases of public feeling and of military opinion in
Richmond during the progress of the operation by which
General McClellan transferred his army from the Chickahomi
ny to the James, were highly interesting to me at the time,
and it may be worth while for me briefly to describe them
now.
Let me premise by stating however, that the Prinee is cer
tainly in error, when he speaks of General Beauregard as
“ lending the assistance of his capacity and his prestige” to
the Southern army at this critical moment. General Beaure
gard was then at Eufaula, in Alabama, recruiting his health,
shattered by two arduous-campaigns, one in the East and one
in the West. Very few, if any of the troops from his army
were in Virginia. Reinforcements had been coming into the
city for several days previously to the 25th, in very consider
able numbers, but they appeared to me to be mainly made up
of new troops, and were generally understood to be so.
Of the battle with Hooker on the 25th, in which the con
federates were defeated, nothing was heard in Richmond save
the sound of the cannonade, and to that we had all become
so much accustomed as not to be much excited thereby. The
negroes, who always, by some mysterious system of commu
nication with the surrounding country, contrived to have news
in advance of the published accounts, and whose reports I
generally found to be quite as accurate as those of the “ Dis
patch” and the “Examiner,” whispered indeed on the morn
ing of the 26th in the servants’ halls, from which the story
soon ran up stairs, that something not altogether agreeable
had happened the day before. But the popular rumor was,
that a slight skirmish had taken place, with the inevitable re
suit of “skedaddled” and captured Yankees.
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About eight o’clock on the evening of the m xt day, the 26th,
when after four hours of the nearest and most vivid firing,
bmh with great gnus and musketry that had yet been heard,
the white wreaths of the curling cannon-smoke began to be
drifted by the wind up the Shockoe valley into the heart of
the city, and the smell of the gmi-powdcr coidd be plainly
perceived in Capitol Square. affairs took a more serious turn.
1 witnessed the fight of this evening myself from a favorable
position on the outskirts of the city. 1 saw the confederate
lines recoil, and our own artillery advance until between
eight and nine o'clock. I began to think that we had really
reached the crisis of the siege, and that Richmond was on the
point of falling into the hands of the army of the Union. A
young officer of artillery, a West Pointer from the old army,
and belonging then to a detached corps of the C. S. A., who
joined me in my post of observation about that time, and
recognized with me the fact that the confederates were fight
ing on a line considerably in the rear of the positions which
they had held about four p. m., borrowed my glass, looked
long and earnestly through the deepening twilight on the scene
before us, and then, turning to me, said in a hnrried way,—■
■■ they will certainly be here to-night,” and then, half laughing
with an air of somewhat affected indifference added, as he tap
ped his light grey uniform coat, •• had n’t I better take this off
and ‘skedaddle’ to Danville'’’
Ity nine o’clock, however, and, so far as we coidd see, with
no change in the relative strength of the firing on either side,
the federal artillery still maintaining its plain and tremendous
preponderance—the line of the federal (ire began to recede.
By half-past nine the affair was over, and after an hour or two
of spasmodic and still receding discharges, mainly of shell,
vhicli burned in magnificent curves against the darkening
sky, every tiling was once more quiet.
Thu next day was an anxious rue to the people of Rich
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mond. It was evident now that a general action was either
immiicnt or actually in progress. The stories from the battle
field of Gaines’s Mill came in, announcing a great victory, and
anxiety gradually turned into exultation, which grew as the
prisoners began to arrive in small squads, and the people be
came convinced that the army of McClellan was actually re
treating.
For the next day or two, this mood was in the ascendant,
and nothing was talked of but the capture or annihilation of
the whole “ invading horde.” Much was made of the two
captured Generals Reynolds and McCall, who naturally grew
into four, five or six, according to the strength of the speak
er’s patriotism, and of his imagination. General McClellan
was killed three or four times, and General Sumner was cer
tainly wounded and a prisoner at Savage’s station.
Jackson’s corps, which had not been engaged as the Prince
seems to suppose on the 26th with McCall, the fight of that
day being maintained on the confederate side by the troops
of A. P. Hill and Longstreet in the advance, had come into
action upon the federal retreat on the 28tb, and this intelli
gence of itself would have sufficed to convince the most
skeptical that the doom of the Yankees was sealed, and that
the tobacco warehouses of Richmond would be too small to
contain the prisoners that were about to arrive.
By the 30th, however, it began to be whispered that all was
not going satisfactorily. It was then known to a few that
McClellan had not been cut to pieces in detail; that on the
contrary, he had succeeded in effecting the concentration of
his whole army, and was moving on a line of retreat which, as
it was not thoroughly understood, might perhaps, prove to be
a new line of advance. The fearful tidings of the repulse and
slaughter at Malvern Hill at last forced its way through the
popular hope and passion, and the news that the gunboats in
the river ha 1 joined their fire with that of the artillery of
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the federal land forces converted the rejoicings of the Vir
ginians into doubts and disappointments. Lor some time it
a as supposed McClellan would resume his attack on the line
of the Charles City road ; then, that lie would shift his -whole
force to the south side and throw himself irresistibly from City
Point upon POLrsburg. The results of the terrible six days’
tiglitiug were not regarded as at all decisive, and General Lee,
while honored for his success in relieving the immediate pres
sure upon the city, and in “chastising the Yankees” tre
mendously, was loudly charged with having been outwitted
by an adversary whose escape he ought to have rendered im
possible.
The final movement which transferred the whole federal
army from Harrison's Landing to the Potomac, and which
was going on when I left Richmond was hardly credited at
that time in that city. It was certainly felt that if real, it
would be a substantial relief from all formidable operations
against tlie place, at least for the next year.
As to the confederate forces engagedin these sanguinary
battles before Richmond, it is my impression that the armies
united under Lee before the arrival of Jackson from the Shen
andoah, numbered 90.0D0 men ; and the Prince's estimate of
Jackson’s force at 30,000, 1 take to be not far from the truth.
'The prisoners taken from our army, including the wounded,
whom we were forced to abandon, were estimated at between 7
and s/iOo, of whom only about 4,500, however, were actually
known to have been sent on to Richmond. On their own
side, the most candid and best-informed confederates admitted
a total loss in killed, wounded, and missing of about 10,000
men.
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